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I.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant Lo
Utah Code

S78w2-a-3(2)(I)

as , •• appeal

regarding alimonyr c h i l d suppo.r:f

from, a final

judgment

:\i tal estate distribution in

a divorce decree entered by the Second Judicial District C

z.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Re

experts'

la

Jt attorney's fees and

fet-h, Utah

Code Ann, §30-' ' \ as amended,

attached as Exhibit

Relative

* ti.e issues of alimony, child

support and th ^,..,,,
(eff.

assets, Utah Code Ann. §30-3

May 2, J S>»*4 ) LS attached as Exhibit

of gross income

Qf

1 \*'-M } is

*v - . -

a spouse, Utah Code Ann. §78-45 :

1, 1
STATEMENT OF CASE
April

1- .

Compla

*"'% xileH -

a*-".*
,

,

Record"

hereinafter

referred
Holt

s#

filed a Verified Answer and Counterclaim * r

S™

entered by the Court regarding

custodyf visit^tior
and alimony
lljyi«

i

-,,

support in
i::U;Llf t

i

:: $600.00 by Minute Entry dated June 9,
. * .

: .Leu uy LUC parties.

1

On

October

27,

1993, additional

temporary

Orders

reducing

child

support from $1,400 to $938 based upon Nicholas Holt, the parties'
oldest son, residing with Mr* Holt were entered by the Court, with
a denial of Mrs. Holt's Motion to Increase of Alimony.
113).

(R. 111-

A pre-trial conference was held January 20, 1994, at which

time Mrs. Holt's request for $20,000 in temporary attorney's fees
was denied except in the amount of $3,000 and a three day trial was
scheduled for June 1, 1994.

(R. 210). From June 13 to June 15,

1994, a trial was held before the Honorable Brent W. West, Second
District Court Judge presiding; the Court immediately granted Mr.
Holt a divorce, ruled on custody and visitation and reserved all
economic issues for further consideration.

(R. 240-243).

On

August 3, 1994, the Court entered its Ruling awarding alimony,
dividing the marital estate, awarding tax exemptions and fees, and
requesting the parties to present proposed buy-out plans for 50% of
the Codale Stock awarded to Mrs. Holt.
Exhibit 4 ) .

(R. 282-287; attached as

Mr. Holt filed his Motion to Clarify, Supplement

and/or Reconsider Findings, submitting a plan for redeeming Mrs.
Holt's Codale Electric stock.

(R. 298-99).

Mrs. Holt filed a

Motion to Correct Ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets for
New Trial.

(R. 304-345).

by the Court.

Both Motions were heard November 4, 1994

On January 4, 1995, the Court entered its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the June 13-15, 1994 Trial and
November 5, 1994 Hearing on Post-Trial Motions (R. 354-66; attached
2

as Exhibit 5) and the Order and Judgment (R. 367-376; attached as
Exhibit 6 ) .

On January 20, 1995, the Court entered an Order on

Post Trial Motions (R. 386-91 ; attached as Exhibit " ) •

On February

2, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed a voluminous Rule 59 Motion and Memorandum
(100 pages) to Alter,
Judgment,

Amend Findings, Conclusions, Order and

to Distribu

Jdii. .. ^nai

An set

< ? I ,

containing multiple Affidavits and Exhibit-,

<.

attached as Exhibit ^, vithout Memorandum . Support).

u

New Trial,
,^m

Motion

:i March

1995, Mrs. Holi filed
:': L.~. . Motions denying

21, 1995, the Court entered . \.* Order i-:- :•'/
a ] I re] i--r requested r-.-v M? • M
9)

"4

\ [ ; attached ?s Exhibit

On April

(R. 5 4 3 ) .
Appea ]

- •

••

->ea 1.

7" - :*M * of Appeal entered a dismissal of Mrs, Holt s
IK. o4/j.

^:iil 20, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed an Amended

Notice of Appeal-

31.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

Daie

and

Vickie Holt were married

19 I 2 , and were separatee
hereinafter

~' * .

11. y

December ,

I

\ t- parents oi three minor children,

the oldest of whom ••-.-• living with Dale at the time of the trial;
the

l

'." yooihje i. "I
2.

• 1t.

Pursuant to the temporary order ot tiie tonit, Udie

Holt paid to the Plaintiff temporary support of $938.00 for child

3

support and $600,00 for alimony.

(R. 111-113). Mrs. Holt resided

in the marital residence which has no mortgage.
3.

Ms. Holt was a homemaker during the marriage, was

not employed, and no income was imputed to her by the trial court.
Both parties were in their forties at the time of trial.

(Finding

23) .
4.

Mr. Holt is the president and owner of 97.6 percent

of the shares of Codale Electric Company ("Codale").

(Finding 15).

Codale is a distributor of a wide range of electrical products; its
primary location is Salt Lake City, Utah. Codale had no employment
or non-compete restriction with Mr. Holt.
5.

The parties stipulated as to the value of all of the

marital assets, with the exception of an MG automobile and the
value of their stock in Codale.
6.

(Finding 17).

As President of Codale, Dale Holt had W-2 income

(including taxable income related to company cars and travel
awards) of $79,731 in 1992 (T. 76), and $80,334 in 1993 (T. 77).
He testified that his income in 1994 would be approximately the
same as the prior year (T. 77). In 1990 and 1991, he withdrew from
the corporation additional income, which was used to purchase the
property upon which the office building currently housing Codale
and

which

is

represented

by

the

Partnership. (T. 130-131)

4

value

of

Holt

Properties

:
;

"

he * rial court found that, during the last few

years of the m a n . ;

parties, they expended between $3,800

and $4,200 per month for the entire family of five for all expenses
includinq

ir payments and entertainment; the Court further; found
yl<

ill

I lif

[irir.l l e s

' w 11k i q e a i e < i i

Mi .

tiolt

s

qross

annual paid income of approximately $80,000 per year (Finding J4).
Mrs. Holt testified that

: .*

: - .** engthy period of separation
r month

support

.

parties had

».;,;*•

marital debt as c :

.

debt

'rin.

of

(I"

temporary

'>.!4|,

The

The house in which

modest, being valued at the
stipulated amount
8

i >±\:

.

>rHnrr 17\,

Plaintiff and Defendant each had an expert witness
JI

Electric Supply, Inc.

the

stock

Codale

Mr. Paul Shields testified

ia It;

»J"

Vickie Holt and valued the interest of the parties .»; - 4 million
M?) .

He .ii-knnwl edqed

that ,, U L C I

reviewinq

valuation report of Mr. Dave Dorton, Mr. Holt's expert
made an error

the
* hail

-* . h initial calculation in the sum of $500,000 or

$600, 000 I"

-

-ried that hi s valuation was

dependent upon the business continuing as it had
actively involved

(T.

.

He acknowledged that

Coda] e ; \) oi i] c:i b e s i q u i f

i

-

- , nuxt aid nul w

for the company, or if

enter into « non-competit
5

agreement on the sale of the shares (T. 387). He was unable to put
a value on the company in either of those eventualities.
testified

that

if

Mr.

Holt

were

to

compete

with

He

Codale, an

appropriate value for Codale would be its net tangible assets (T.
386-87) . Mr. Shields agreed that the book value of the company was
$3.3 million dollars, and that figure assumed a sale of all the
inventory.

(T. 18-19).
9.

Mr. Dave Dorton, expert witness for the Defendant,

testified that the orderly liquidation value of Codale was $3.2
million dollars.

(T. 183). He further testified that the company

had one million dollars of good will, but that the entire amount of
good will was personal to Mr. Holt.

(T. 198). Mr. Dorton stated

that Mr. Holt was the key employee, which was also reiterated by
Mr. Shields. Mr. Dorton testified that in the absence of Dale Holt
working in the business, liquidation value of the company would be
the most appropriate measure of value which he stated as $2.8.
10.

Mr. Dorton's testimony was

consistent with the

testimony of Mrs. Holt's expert, Mr. Shields, who also agreed that
the valuation of the company depended upon the actions of Dale
Holt.

Mr. Shields admitted that, if Mr. Holt left the company, it

would destroy both the personal and business good will.

According

to Mr. Shields, it could take "forever" to derive $5.4 million
dollars from the sale of the company without Mr. Holt.

6

(T. 397).

He admitted that his valuations never considered the departure of
Mr.

Holt.

-."' •'•• • •"-.•. i 1

Shields

jwj»-» :i that !:: he I:: sst vaJ uat:i on method of

a company is wha*: ^ ^.iiru i i.yer would actually be willing to pay
for the company.

{±. J3b/.

'he Court received into evidence,
Z

w h i c h w a s u n r e f u t e d , a n o f f e r to fjuicl'irise tt:nia 1 e 1,1,1 t h e anu

$3.3 million dollars, which had been received approximately four
moi iths pi: i c i: to the tria ;
continued association of

The offer was contingent upon the
.-. [ e Holt:

| [Jlla ,i ntlt: t s Kxl'iiti i l

I 4 ; "T.

74- 75) .
1-

nedj.*'

implication of the. i;3tr.i'^inn
Hunter,
1

:

testifying

i<

* *

sold

,

.

testimony

;

regarding

\& m a r i t a l e s t a Ie

^:* r e h a ; f

-• : ^ s

Holt,

the
Mi

stated

tax

Robert
that

igered when * ie assets were actually
n escape evtit

The only poss;.

hdvtiwi

I .

pay capital gains tax on the sale of the Codale stock would be if
3oiu jLt . v

-

•

-M-* childre

\ft^r t
Conclusions
376;
Mrs.

,
354-66; — .

) awarding each party 50%
•

• j^.

ana ^udgemer;

f the marital estate, awarding

Oily pi:,»i: iTioi'ii hi all. u

remarriage

ox: cohabitation and ordering Mr. Holt
support.

7

-

.e. month ch:

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS APPEAL
Did the District Court err, as a matter of law, by
awarding alimony to the Defendant in the amount of $2,000 per month
where there is no factual basis for a requisite finding of need.
Cross-Appellant does not challenge the Findings of Fact of the
Court with regard to the alimony issue, but rather challenges the
Court's Conclusion of Law that there is a sufficient legal basis
for its award of alimony.
civil

cases

particular

are

reviewed

deference

questions of law.

The trial court's Conclusions of Law in
for

correctness,

meaning

is given to the trial court's

that

no

ruling

on

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994);

Klinqer v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 879 (Utah 1990).
ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL
POINT I
THE RECEIVING SPOUSE MUST ESTABLISH NEED IN
ORDER TO JUSTIFY AN AWARD* OF ALIMONY.
It is well settled law in the State of Utah that the
purpose of an award of alimony is to provide the receiving spouse
with financial support to enable that spouse to enjoy, as nearly as
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.

In

establishing an award of alimony, the trial court is obligated to
consider

the

financial

conditions

and

needs

of

the

receiving

spouse, his or her ability to support him or herself, and the
ability of the paying spouse to provide the support.
8

Jones v.

J o n e s , 700 P.2d 1072

;_0~5 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) ,

uedl -if iioct^t

Trial courts have a great

alimony a w a r d s , but the trial court's

c o n c l u s i o n of l a w w i t h respect to alimony awards i s t o b e r .•,.••-.
for correctness , wi th no particular difference being accorded t. .
t lie 1.1: i.ci 1. co

•

Brienholt j/,. Brienholt, 2 7 6 Adv. Rpts. 38, 39

(Utah Ct. App. October, 1995),
::• making the assessment of need and ability to support
' '"M-i'Sp 1 f

riimben*'

up'.in

the

trial

consideration * ,o income that a receivina
assets that have been

awarded

court

take

into

will receive from

SDCI

'

to

e

pursuant

)

i tne marital estate. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841
(Uta

^rm- 1 W?) .
POINT II
VICKIE HOLT CANNOT ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE
NEED TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ALIMONY IN THIS
CASE.
The trial court found that the expenses of the entire

h.

*

members where

living together were

\ « h Ic 1 i

b e twe e i - .

:i i I c ] i I d e d

benefits received by way of Codale Electric Supply, Inc.
fact -. .

Lndings were not challenged by Mrs, HoLt,

ordered Mr. Hoi t to pay ch i 1 d suppor t: <

eav

a i i. < •'»i i s
These

"The Court
Mr s

Hoi t

with a net monthly shortfall at most $3,263, which amount does not
take i nt :: > consideration the fact that she is supporting three

people, not five.

The Court further found that the cash payments

to be made to Mrs. Holt to purchase her interest in Codale could
return and income, on a tax free basis, of six percent (6%). The
first payment of $500,000 was to be received within 60 days after
the entry of the final order.

Even assuming a deduction from the

half million dollar payment of twenty-eight percent (28%) to pay
her capital gains liability, she would be left with a net payment
in the first year of $337,762. As demonstrated by the Plaintiff's
exhibit number P-6 submitted to the Court in the November, 1994
hearing, by the end of 1996 Mrs. Holt would have tax free interest
income and tax free child support totalling over $4,100 per month.
Clearly, if one were to calculate even a twenty percent (20%)
reduction

in the cost of maintaining the standard of living

attributable to the absence of Mr. Holt and his teenage son from
the

family

(an

assumption

that

is, on

its

face,

extremely

conservative), the award of $2,000 per month permanent alimony far
exceeds the actual needs of Mrs. Holt.

The trial court's award,

when judged in the light of the Court's own unchallenged findings,
was clearly erroneous, and should be set aside.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Mrs. Holt fails to marshall the evidence submitted

by Mr. Holt at trial and is therefore precluded from challenging
the Findings of Fact.
10

2.

The Trial Court heard extensive testimony from Dale

Holt's expert, David Dorton and Mrs. Holt's expert, Paul Shields,
regarding valuation of the 97.6% stock ownership of Codale.
Holt

testified

that Codale has no employment

Mr.

or non-compete

agreement with him, leaving him free to initiate a competing
business, and further, that the customers of Codale are loyal to
him and a product of his hard work and personal service. The Court
accepted the valuation of Mr. Holt's expert of $2.8 for the Codale
stock, finding that Codale had no "good will".

The Court fairly

and equitably divided the marital assets by giving fifty percent
(50%) of all assets to each party, and requiring Codale to redeem
Mrs. Holt's shares of stock by paying her $1,344,509 in three
installments over a two year period, incurring interest at the rate
of four percent (4%) per annum.

The Court's factual findings are

well supported by the trial record and its division of marital
assets is fair and equitable to the parties.

Mrs. Holt's appeal

simple re-argues factual issues decided by the trial court.
3.

After taking into consideration the significant cash

and property awards to Mrs. Holt, the Court awarded Mrs. Holt
$2,000 per month alimony based upon Mr. Holt's historical income
over a five year period of $80,000 per year. Mr. Holt's income was
determined from the parties' tax return and testimony offered by
Mr. Holt

regarding

the

1991 and

11

1992 contributions

to Holt

Properties Partnership which was effectively divided fifty percent
(50%) each to Mr. and Mrs. Holt.
Fact

showing

it made

regarding alimony.

The Court entered Findings of

consideration

of

all

required

factors

With $2,000 per month alimony, $938 child

support, and tax free income from the cash received through
redemption of the Codale stock, Mrs. Holt will receive monthly
income substantially in excess of the monthly expenses of the
entire family during the marriage found by the Court to be between
$3,800 to $4,200 per month.
4.

The Court found no economic need for Mrs. Holt to be

awarded attorney's fees in light of the substantial property award
and alimony award.
ARGUMENT OF APPELLEE
Mrs. Holt appeals virtually every ruling by the trial
court in a shotgun approach that immediately raises the specter of
frivolity and lack of merit.

Mrs. Holt generally re-argues her

entire case and simply requests the Court of Appeals to substitute
their judgment for that of the trial court on all factual issues.
In fact, a very significant portion of Mrs. Holt's Brief relies on
evidence which cannot be considered by the Court of Appeals in that
the evidence was not submitted at trial but in support of Mrs.
Holt's post-trial Rule 59 Motion, which was denied.

Mr. Holt has

moved to strike those portions of Mrs. Holt's Brief which refer to
or rely upon post-trial evidence, a copy of which is attached as
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Exhibit 10 and is reiterated and incorporated by reference.

Mrs.

Holt fails to marshall the evidence in support of her position that
the Findings of Fact should be set aside and the myriad of cases
submitted often support Mr. Holt's position. This Brief shall show
that Mrs. Holt's Appeal is totally lacking in merit.
I.
Mrs. Holt Fails to Marshall the Evidence
Section 12 of Mrs. Holt's Brief, pages 20-24, entitled
"Marshalling of Evidence," fails to examine evidence presented at
trial by Mr. Holt in support of his legal positions and further
fails

to demonstrate

the trial Court's

error.

As

stated

in

Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994), this
Court Held:
To successfully challenge these findings,
plaintiff "must marshall the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be
s
against the clear weight of the evidence,'
thus making them Nclearly erroneous.'" In re
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1989) (quoting State v. State, 743 P.2d 191,
193 (Utah 1987)). "If the appellant fails to
marshall the evidence, the appellate court
assumes that the record supports the findings
of the trial court and proceeds to a review of
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions
of law and the application of that law in the
case". Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199
(Utah 1991).
Plaintiff has not properly
challenged the findings in the instant case.
We therefore assume that the record support
the trial court's findings ....
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II.
The Property Distribution is Consistent
With Principals of Otah Law
After assigning values to individual assets, including
valuing Codale Electric Supply Inc. stock at $2,732,000 (Finding
15, Ex. 5; R. 360) the Court awarded Dale Holt and Vickie Holt
fifty percent (50%) each of the marital assets as follows (Finding
18, Ex. 5; R. 361):
To the Defendant:
Personal Residence
IRA Account
401(k) Retirement Account
Retirement Plan
By-out of Codale Shares
to equalize assets

$
$
$
$

153,000
20,323
89,789
133,109

Total:

$1,740,639

$1.344,509

To the Plaintiff:
Codale Electric Supply Stock
Holt Properties Partnership
Note: Payable
Total:

100% of the Stock
owned by the parties
$ 360,488
$
16,000
$1,740,639

Mr. Holt owned 97.6 percent interest in Codale which
leases

a

building

Partnership.

and

real

property

from

Holt

Properties

Mrs. Holt appeals the valuation of Codale stock by

the trial court despite the valuation being within the range of
value testified to by the experts. Mrs. Holt appeals the pay-out
14

Order because of the resulting tax consequences, requiring Codale
to purchase the stock from Mrs. Holt.

The clear reality is that

the Court's property distribution treats the parties equally and
fairly and equitably divides the marital estate.
1.

Standards of Utah Law.

The general guidelines

a trial court must follow in property distribution are well stated
in Newmeyer v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987):
In making such order, the trial court is
permitted broad latitude, and its judgment is
not to be lightly disturbed, so long as it
exercises its discretion in accordance with
the standards set by this court.
Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1975); see
Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986).
It is therefore incumbent on the appealing
party to prove that the trial court's division
violates those standards, (See, e.g. Jones.
700 P.2d at 1074) or that the trial court's
Factual Findings upon which the division is
grounded are clearly erroneous under Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a).
In Berrv v. Berry, 635 P.2d

68 (Utah 1981) the Utah

Supreme Court further set forth principals:
There is no fixed formula which a trial judge
must
follow
in
making
a
division
of
properties. Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah
1975). It is the prerogative of the court to
make whatever disposition of property it deems
fair,
equitable
and
necessary
for
the
protection
and welfare of the parties.
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah
1977). This division will not be disturbed on
appeal unless the record shows that there has
been an abuse of discretion.
Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).
15

2.

The Trial Court's Valuation

of Codale

Within the Range Established by Expert Testimony «

Stock

is

This court has

established clear guidelines for trial court valuation of marital
assets.

In Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1989), this

court stated:
This court's valuation of stock is a factual
determination. See Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d
468, 471 (Utah 1984). Accordingly we review
the court's findings regarding the valuation
of
stock under the
"clearly erroneous"
standard of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Under this standard of
review, Findings of Fact will be set aside
only if they are "against the clear weight of
evidence, or if the Appellant court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." State v. Walker. 743
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Weston at p. 410.
Citing

the

Supreme

Court

decision

of

Newmeyer

v.

Newmeyer, supra, the Weston Court stated:
"When acting as a trier of fact, the trial
judge is entitled to give conflicting opinions
whatever
weight
she deems
appropriate".
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer at 1278; Weston v. Weston
at 410. So long as the value is within the
ranges established by expert testimony, the
appeals court will not overturn the trial
court's valuation of assets. Weston v. Weston
at 410; Newmeyer v. Newmeyer at 1278; see
Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah App.
1993) Argyle v. Argyle at 471.
The trial court determined that the 97.6 % of Codale
stock acquired by Dale Holt during the course of the marriage
should be valued at $2,732,000.
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(Finding

15, Ex. 5; R 371).

Codale maintains no employment or non-compete agreement with Dale
Holt and as a result Mr. Holt could cease providing services to
Codale at any time or start a competing business.

In un rebutted

testimony, Mr. Holt testified that the customers of Codale are
loyal to him and are comprised of individuals he has attracted
through years of hard work and personal service.

It is his opinion

that if he chose to open a competing business to Codale, the
customers would follow him.

As a result, David Dorton, Mr. Holt's

expert testified that the total value of Codale is $2.8 million,
the liquidation value of the assets. Mr. Dorton further testified
that the business did not have "good will" since the customer base
was contingent on Mr. Holt's being employed by Codale.

Vickie

Holt's expert, Paul Shields, testified that the business is valued
at $5.4, including good will, but admitted on cross examination
that the value of Codale would be significantly less if Mr. Holt
ceased to an active participant in Codale but would not arrive at
a valuation figure.

Mr. Shields agreed the book value of the

company was $3.3 million.

The trial court agreed with Dale Holt's

expert in the valuation.
Vickie Holt's disputing

the trial court's ruling

on

valuation is nothing more than a request that the Court of Appeal
re-determine a factual issue heard by the trial court.
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The Utah

Supreme Court aptly addressed a similar argument in Newmeyer v.
Newmeyer, at 1278, stating:
This argument like the one that proceeds it is
nothing but an attempt to have this Court
substitute its judgment for the of the trial
court on a contested factual issue. This we
cannot do under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 52(a) •..
It is elementary that a judge is not bound to
believe one witness's testimony to the total
exclusion of that of another witness. When
acting as a trier of fact, the trial judge is
entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever
weight
he
or
she
deems
appropriate,
(citations omitted).
3.
Business.

This

Codale has No "Good Will" Associated with the
court

will

uphold

as

is

a

trial

court's

determination that an on-going business concern does not have good
will where the trial court's determination is based on the evidence
proffered.

In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988),

the trial court determined that the Defendant husband's hay-hauling
business did not have good will consistent with the husband's
expert valuation.

Mrs. Stevens appealed.

In the process of

upholding the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals defined
good will as follows:
Good will is the advantage or benefit which is
acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere
value of the capital, stocks, funds or
property employed therein, in consequence of
the general patronage and encouragement which
it receives
from constant or habitual
customers on account of its location or local
position or reputation for quality, skill,
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integrity or punctuality. It is something in
business which gives reasonable expectancy of
preference
in the race of competition.
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 85; 415
P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966); see also 38 C.J.S.
Goodwill, section 1 (1943) ...
Where appropriate, the good will value of a
business enterprise is subject to equitable
distribution.
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d
1076, 1080 n.l (Utah 1988). There can be no
good will in a business that is dependant for
its existence upon the individual who conducts
the enterprise and would vanish were the
individual to die, retire or quit work.
Jackson, 18 Utah 2d at 86, 415 P.2d at 670.
Stevens v. Stevens, at 956.
The record supports the trial court agreeing with Dale
Holt's expert that Codale has no good will.
R.

360.

Codale

has

no

long

term

See Finding 15, Ex. 5;

employment

or

non-compete

agreement with Mr. Holt and Mr. Holt testified that the customer
base of Codale is loyal to him and based upon his hard work and
personals service.

If Mr. Holt were to leave, the customers would

follow him.
The trial court appropriately determined Codale has no
good will to distribute as a marital asset consistent with the
principal stated in Stevens. Accord Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P.2d
774 (Utah 1992).
4.
With Utah Law.

The Pay Out Ordered on Assets is Consistent

In Weston v. Weston, at 410, this Court stated:

In dividing the martial estate, the trial
court can enter
such orders concerning
19

property distribution and alimony as are
equitable.
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5
(1987).
"In making such orders, the trial
court is permitted broad latitude, and its
judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so
long as it exercised its discretion in
accordance with the standards set by this
court." Newmever, 745 P.2d at 1277; see also
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah
App. 1988).
In exercising its broad discretion, the trial
court may fashion a variety of methods for
dividing assets. See Naranio v. Naranio, 751
P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Utah 1988) There is no
fixed formula for the division of marital
property.
Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68, 69
(Utah 1981). Further, M[i]t is the court's
duty to make a division of the property and
income in a divorce procedure so that the
parties may readjust their lives to the new
situation as well as possible.
The principal of disentangling the marital relationship
with respect to joint stock ownership in a closely held corporation
was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Argyle v. Argyle, at 471
when it reiterated an oft-quoted principal:
Wherever possible, this Court avoids division
of marital stock between the parties because
it forces them to be in a "close economic
relationship which has every potential for
further contention, friction and litigation,
especially when third parties having nothing
to do with the divorce will also necessarily
be involved", citing Savage v. Savage, 658
P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983).
The trial court awarded Mrs. Holt fifty percent (50%) of
the parties stock acquired during the course of marriage which was
valued at $1,344,509 and required Codale to redeem the stock or
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Dale Holt to purchase the stock with an initial payment of $500,000
sixty days from the entry of the Decree, payment of an additional
$422,254 within one year of the first payment and the final
$422,254 within two years of the initial payment which would bear
interest at the rate of four percent (4%) per annum.
17, Ex. 6; R. 395.)

(Order, para.

Dale Holt and Vickie Holt were each required

to pay any tax liability associated with the sale of the stock.
(Order, para. 18, Ex. 6; R. 378-79). The court further ordered the
parties to submit a plan to acquire the Defendant's one-half
interest in the shares to minimize the tax consequences as much as
possible to the Defendant (Order, para 14, Ex. 6; R. 376-77).
However, Mrs. Holt did not submit an alternative plan post-trial
and the trial court accepted the proposal submitted by Dale Holt
(Order on Post-Trial Motions, para 4 and 5, January 20, 1995, Ex.
7; R. 387) .
In Weston v. Weston, at 411, the court examined the
awarding and dividing of stocks in a closely held corporation,
stating:
Marital assets consisting of stock in a
closely held family corporation can be
distributed in divorce proceedings by several
alternate means, including division of the
stock, awarding off-setting property, or cash
payments over time. Citing Lee v* Lee, 744
P.2d 1378, 1380-81 (Utah App. 1987).

21

The trial court's awarding Mrs. Holt of fifty percent
(50%) of the Codale stock and requiring purchase over time is
consistent with principals established by this court.

Likewise,

requiring Mrs. Holt to pay the tax consequences of the distribution
is fair and equitable. Mr. Holt, in the event he sells his stock,
will also be liable for tax consequences of the sale of his stock
and it would be unfair to require him to also bear the burden of
paying the taxes on the corporation purchasing her stock. In Mrs.
Holt's Brief, she repeatedly complains that she has not received
"income producing asset". She in fact is receiving $1,344,509 cash
from sale of the stock and it is difficult to understand why she
complains so loudly.
Mrs. Holt further complains that requiring Codale to only
pay four percent (4%) interest on the payments due over a two year
period is a "abuse of discretion".

However, the trial court has

the latitude to make appropriate adjustments in the relationships
of the parties and make such orders as are fair and equitable given
the overall distribution plan ordered by the court.

The trial

court may award no interest or interest as is appropriate under the
circumstances. (Weston v. Weston, supra; no interest for first four
years, then interest over fifteen years)
5.

Award of Codale Automobiles. Mrs. Hold was awarded

a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a 1987 BMW automobile
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valued at $19,250, both of which were owned by Codale.
19, Ex. 5; R. 374).

(Finding

She was required by the trial court to pay

Codale for both of these automobiles, since she received fifty
percent (50%) of the value of the corporation and the automobiles
were carried on the records of the corporation.

Requiring Mrs.

Holt to pay for the automobiles under the circumstances where she
is receiving fifty percent (50%) of the value of the corporation is
consistent with an equitable distribution of marital assets between
the parties where each party.
6.

Claim of Omitted Assets is Spurious.

Vickie Holt

claims that the Oakridge Country Club membership and a condominium
owned

by

Codale

were

omitted

from

valuation

of

the

assets.

However, the court received testimony on the Oakridge Country Club
membership during trial (T. 596) and it was addressed in the court
findings

(Finding 13).

Further, in the event that Mrs. Holt's

expert did fail to identify and address the Oakridge Country Club
membership during trial, she cannot now be heard to complain for
the first time on appeal.

Regarding the condominium, Dale Holt

purchased the condominium as a residence after conclusion of the
trial since he needed a place to live.
valued at the time of trial.
(Utah 1985).

The marital estate is

Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697

The court cannot continually re-evaluate the marital

estate for months after the divorce trial unless the claim of fraud
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or

concealment

from

the

trial

court

is

alleged.

No

such

allegations can be made against Dale Holt since the condo was not
purchased until after the trial.
7.
Zero.

Mr. Holt's Expert Valued "Intangible Assets" at

The trial court accepted David Dorton's liquidation value

for Codale, under which "Intangible Assets" were assigned no value.
(Exhibit P-21, p. 56). By asserting that this Court should award
her an additional $173,600 as one-half the value of the intangible
assets of Codale, Mrs. Holt is requesting this Court to substitute
its judgment on a factual issue for that of the trial court.
8.

The Trial Court Made a Fair and Equitable Division

of the Marital Estate.

Consistent with sound principals of Utah

case law, the trial court made a fair and equitable distribution of
the marital assets between Dale Holt and Vickie Holt. The division
of the marital property awards each party one-half of the marital
estate.

The trial court award of assets accomplished the goal of

re-adjusting lives to a new situation as well as possible. Arqyle
v. Arqyle. at 471.
III.
THB ALIMONY AWARD ENABLES MRS. HOLT TO MAINTAIN
THE STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE MARRIAGE
The trial court award of alimony enables Mrs. Holt to
maintain, and within two years, significantly exceed the standard
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of living to which she was accustomed during her marriage to Dale
Holt.

The trial court found that the parties had been married

twenty-three years and that Vickie Holt had contributed to the
business though she is not employed outside the house.

(Finding

23, Ex. 5; R. 363). The monthly living expenses for the entire
family during the marriage were found to be between $3,800 and
$4,200 per month, though Mrs. Holt had for several months lived on
temporary

support of $1,538 per month without incurring any

additional debt.

(Finding 24, Ex. 5; R. 464).

Based upon Mr.

Holt's testimony and the parties' income tax returns, the court
found over a five year period a historical gross annual income of
$80,000 for Mr. Holt.

(Finding 7, Ex. 5; R. 356-57).

The court

found that the $1,344,509 awarded to Mrs. Holt can earn tax free
income of six percent (6%) per year.

(Finding 25, Ex. 5; R. 364).

The Court awarded Mrs. Holt alimony of $2,000 per month terminable
upon death, remarriage or co-habitation.

(Finding 26, Ex. 5; R.

364) .
1.

Requirements of Utah Law in Awarding Alimony.

The

general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from
becoming a public charge and to maintain to the extent possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Howell v. Howell,
806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied,
(Utah 1991).

817 P.2d 327

In determining whether to award alimony and setting
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the amount

the trial court must consider

(1) the

financial

conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of
the receiving spouse to provide for him or herself; and (3) the
ability of the payor spouse to provide support.

English v.

English, 564 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977); Chambers v. Chambers,
840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992).

Where a trial court has

considered these three factors and has supported its rulings with
adequate findings based upon sufficient evidence, the Court of
Appeals will not disturb the trial court's determination unless it
has clearly abused its discretion. Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547,
550 (Utah App. 1993); Chambers, supra at 843.
A.

Vickie Holt's Financial Condition and Need.

The

trial court found that Mrs. Holt stayed at home raising the
parties' children and imputed no income to her.

The trial court

found that the living expenses submitted at trial were "excessive"
but determined that the household living expenses during the
marriage were between $3,800 and $4,200 per month. The trial court
further found that Mrs. Holt and the parties children lived on
$1,538 per month temporary support and incurred no debt during that
period. There is no further finding by the trial court on need of
Vickie Holt to receive alimony.
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B.

Ability of Mr. Holt to Provide for Himself.

Mr.

Holt received $80,000 per year income from the corporation which is
adequate to meet his expenses.
C.

Ability of Mr. Holt to Provide Support.

The trial

court found that Mr. Holt's historical income during the five year
period prior to trial was $80,000 per year. Regarding Dale Holt's
income, Vickie Holt intentionally attempts to mislead this court in
her Brief at page 24 by failing to disclose the evidence submitted
at trial regarding Mr. Holt's income and, again re-arguing her case
for a different factual determination by this court.

Mrs. Holt

asserts that Dale Holt's tax returns disclose income in 1990 of
$340,239, for 1991, $309,347, for 1992, $83,672 and for 1993,
$158,653 which including Schedule K-l income from Holt Properties
Partnership.

Mrs. Holt fails to note that in 1990 and 1991, a

total of approximately $465,000 was taken as income in order to
purchase the ground for the building in which Codale leases space
and to pay for improvements to the building through Holt Properties
Partnership,

His

income

in

1990

and

1991,

after

those

contributions was less than $80,000 per year, which included fringe
benefits.

His salary was $65,000 per year, and his testimony was

unrefuted that he paid $2400 per month to Mrs. Holt to run the
household.

(T. 130-32).

Further, in 1992, the $63,500 "income"

from Holt Properties Partnership was in fact not distributable
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income but paper income since the money was put back into the
building through Holt Properties Partnership,

Mrs. Holt received

fifty percent (50%) of the value of Holt Properties Partnership,
which had a total value of $360,000. Further, Mr. Holt testified
that his income for 1994 at the time of trial was consistent with
his prior years' income of $80,000.
D.

The Alimony and Child Support Exceed the Family

Living Expenses.

Vickie Holt, during the first sixty days after

entry of the Decree, received the following monthly income:
$2,000
$ 975

Alimony
Child Support

$2,500

Tax Free Income (6% of $500,000)

$5,475

TOTAL

One year and two months after the Decree, Mrs. Holt is
scheduled to receive $422,000 plus $16,880 interest or $438,880
which at the rate of six percent (6%) interest per year means she
will receive an additional $2,194 per year towards her income. One
year later, she will receive an additional distribution of $438,000
which will earn her an additional $2,194 per month. At the end of
the two year and two month period, Mrs. Holt's tax free income
would be $T,763 (including child support) plus taxable alimony of
$2,000 per month.

This amount far exceeds the monthly living

expense of the family found by the court to be $3,800 to $4,200 per
month.

Where the trial court has addressed each of the required
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factors found in English v. English, and the award of alimony,
child support and income producing property clearly exceeds the
monthly needs, this court should uphold the trial court's findings,
conclusions and award of alimony.
2.

Dale Holt's Income.

Mrs. Holt intends to exploit

the fact that Dale Holt owns 97.6% of Codale, urging the court to
reverse the trial court's decision on alimony.

However, Dale

Holt's income is only one factor to be considered by the court and
only becomes an issue if the trial has not explored and considered
the three factors for determining an appropriate alimony award.
Morgan at 567-69; Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Utah App.
1994) . Here, the trial heard significant testimony on the business
of Codale, its expenses and income and determined that Dale Holt's
income is $80,000 on a historical basis, consistent with principals
of Utah law.

Cox v. Cox at 1267.

The needs of Mrs. Holt and her

standard of living are clearly met and exceeded by the income she
will receive from sale of the stock and the alimony.
is simply asserting

Vickie Holt

she wants more money to live on then is

reasonably necessary to meet her needs.

As found by the trial

court, the expenses to which Mrs. Holt testified she incurred "seem
excessive" (Finding 24; Ex. 5; R. 364). The Court of Appeals will
not second guess the factual determinations of the trial court

29

where it is apparent from the record that the trial court has
appropriately considered all pertinent factors.
The issue of "underemployment" was not raised at trial
and cannot now be considered by the Court of Appeals for the first
time on appeal.

Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns. 791

P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990).
However/ as stated in Cox v. Cox at 1267:
Imputing
income
to
an
unemployed
or
underemployed spouse when setting an alimony
is conceptually appropriate as part of the
determination of that spouse's ability to
produce a sufficient income.
Willey v.
Willev, 866 P.2d 547, 544 (Utah App. 1993).
However, a court should not impute income for
child or spousal support until it first
determines, "as a threshold matter, that
income should be imputed because the (spouse)
is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed."
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,. 1024 (Utah App.
1993). Also see Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5,
Ex. 3.
The trial court made no such threshold determination
regarding Dale Holt.

Mrs. Holt again requests this Court to

substitute its judgment for the trial court's judgment on a factual
determination.
Another legally insufficient position taken by Mrs. Holt
in her Brief (p. 5, para. 6 and fn 22 and 23; p. 37, subpara. b; p.
44, para. 18) is stating that the court should retroactively apply
§ 30-3-5

(7)-(9), effective May 1, 1995 to the trial court's

determination of alimony.

Mrs. Holt fails to establish any legal
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basis for retroactive application of the statute. First, Utah Code
Annotated § 68-3-3 provides that "(n)o part of these revised
statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared". Generally,
Utah Courts will not retroactively apply a statute unless the
legislature declares its intent for that purpose.
Borthick,

769 P.2d

245, 253

(Utah 1988).

See Madsen v.

Second, and more

importantly, the application of the amended statute could not have
been raised at trial and therefore is raised on appeal for the
first time, which under settled principals of Utah law will not be
considered by the Court of Appeal.
3.

The Alimony Award Provides the Standard of Living to

Which Vickie Holt was Accustomed During Marriage. The trial court
considered all three indicia required under English v. English when
awarding Mrs. Holt alimony. Additionally, the award of alimony was
part the overall plan established by the court to allow the parties
to go on with their lives.

The trial court's award of alimony

should be upheld as consistent with the record, the income and
assets of the parties and Utah case law.
4«

Awarding Dale Holt the Tax Exemptions is Fair and

Appropriate* The court found good cause for awarding Dale Holt the
income tax exemptions for the minor children (Finding 8, Ex. 5; R.
361).
finding

As stated by the trial court, "The justification for this
includes, but is not limited to, the fact that the
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Plaintiff has a higher income, provides the majority of support of
the children and can derive greater tax advantage from the use of
the exemptions."
should

receive

The basis upon which Mrs. Holt asserts that she
the income tax exemption

or some

"compensating

award" is that she projects at some point in the future Mr. Holt
will receive little or no tax benefit from the exemption because
his salary will increase (Appellant's Brief, page 46, para. 22).
This court has previously held that a trial court does err in
refusing to adjust property distributions because of theoretical
tax consequences.

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213-14 (Utah

App. 1991) . While the specific facts of the Howell case dealt with
application of tax consequences, the general proposition that a
court does not err in dealing with speculative facts applies to the
proposition stated by Mrs. Holt regarding a speculative increase of
salary for Mr. Holt.
5.
Holt

takes

permanent

Award of Indefinite Alimony is Appropriate.
the

position

non-terminable

inappropriate application

that

the

alimony.

court
Mrs.

should
Holt

have

Mrs.

awarded

again

urges

of § 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated,

amended 1995r to the facts produced at trial in June, 1994.

as
The

change in the statute affects a substantive right and therefore
should not be applied.

Further, this position is raised for the

first time on appeal.
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Additionally, the finding of the trial court that Codale
possesses no good will because much of the business is the
responsibility of Dale Holt is tantamount to stating that Dale Holt
has a professional degree which cannot be shared by a spouse.
Under those circumstances, Utah courts have universally held that
permanent alimony is inappropriate based on "an intangible right
which, because of its character, cannot properly be characterized
as property subject to division between spouses."

Peterson v.

Peterson, 737 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah App. 1987) . See also Martinez v.
Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991) (overturned award of equitable
restitution based on medical decree); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d
1076, 1081 (Utah 1988) (benefit of wife's investment in husband was
adequately reflected in a greater property settlement and higher
alimony); Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d

238

(Utah App. 1987)

(disparity in income due to license is adequately addressed under
traditional alimony analysis).
IV.
MRS, HOLT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A NEED FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
§30-3-3 Utah Code Annotated (1993) provides that the
trial court has discretion to award attorney's fees. However, the
decision to award attorney's fees in divorce cases must be based on
evidence of both financial need and reasonableness.

Rasband v.

Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); Anderson v. Anderson, 757
33

P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah
App. 1990).

The trial court specifically found that Mrs. Holt

could not establish a need for an award of attorney's fees based
upon assets distributed from the marital estate.

(Finding 27, Ex.

5; R. 364).
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Holt has primarily re-argued the facts of her case
to this Court, requesting that this Court redetermine all of the
factual issues previously ruled upon by the trial court. Mrs. Holt
failed her burden to marshall the evidence when attacking the trial
court's Findings of Fact. Mrs. Holt attempted to employ as a basis
for her positions evidence which cannot be considered on Appeal for
a

significant

portion

of

her

Brief.

Mrs. Holt

failed

to

demonstrate how the trial court deviated from established precedent
in any respect, when ruling on the. issues of division of martial
estate, alimony and child support.
The trial court's Findings of fact, Conclusions of Law,
Order and Judgment are consistent with Utah statutes and common law
and should be upheld by this Court in all respects.
DATED this 3\

day of May, 1996.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

fi\
By: ANN L. WASSERMANN, Esq.
E. PAUL WOOD, Esq.
Attorneys for Dale Holt
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justifying divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 725.
Contract between husband or wife and third
person promotive of divorce or separation, what
constitutes, 93 A.L.R.3d 523.
"Incompatibility" within statute specifying it
as substantive ground for divorce, what constitutes, 97 A.L.R.3d 989.
Modern status of views as to validity of
premarital agreements contemplating divorce
or separation, 53 A.L.R.4th 22.
Enforceability of premarital agreements governing support or property rights upon divorce
or separation as affected by circumstances surrounding execution — modern status, 53
A.L.R.4th 85.
Enforceability of premarital agreements governing support or property rights upon divorce
or separation as affected by fairness or adequacy of those terms — modern status, 53
A.L.R.4th 161.

Right to jury trial in state court divorce
proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Lis pendens as applicable to suit for separation or dissolution of marriage, 65 A.L.R 4th
522.
Insanity as defense to divorce or separation
suit — post-1950 cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 277.
Divorce and separation: effect of court order
prohibiting sale or transfer of property on
party's right to change beneficiary of insurance
policy, 68 A.L.R.4th 929.
Joinder of tort action between spouses with
proceeding for dissolution of marriage, 4
A.L.R.5th 972.
Pre-emptive effect of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) provisions (29
USC §§ 1056(d)(3), 1144(a), 1144(b)(7)) with
respect to orders entered in domestic relations
proceedings, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 503.
Key Numbers. — Divorce «=> 12-38, 57-65.

30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife for the same
causes and in the same manner as the wife may obtain a divorce from her
husband.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1209;
C.L. 1917, § 2997; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 403-2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
82, 485 R2d 663 (1971).

ANALYSIS

Both parties at fault.
Cruel treatment.
Both parties a t fault.
Marriage may be dissolved by making a
grant of divorce to each party where each was
equally at fault. Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah 2d

Cruel treatment.
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to
cause great mental distress need not be aggravated and more severe when directed toward
the husband than when directed toward the
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah
1975).

30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs,
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order
may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters
in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
428
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(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other
party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order
or judgment.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-3, e n a c t e d by L.
1993, ch. 137, § 1.
Repeals a n d R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws
1993, ch. 72, § 10 repeals former § 30-3-3,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, allowing a court to

order either party to pay for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and
the children, and enacts the present section,
effective May 3, 1993.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeal from order.
Attorney fees.
—Appeal.
—Award to attorney not permitted.
—Contesting petition for modification.
—Need.
—Reasonable.
Attorney's lien on alimony.
Contempt proceedings.
Costs and expenses on appeal.
Discretion of trial court.
Enforcement of order or decree.
Jurisdiction.
Mandamus.
Order of court.
Stipulation and effect thereof.
Temporary alimony.
Cited.
Appeal from order.
Where there were no findings or evidence in
record as to attorney's fees, Supreme Court
remanded issue for disposition by trial court
but allowed wife's attorney $100 for services
rendered with reference to husband's appeal
from judgment modifying divorce decree. Parish v. Parish, 84 Utah 390, 35 P.2d 999 (1934).
Supreme Court assumed that evidence supported award of suit money to wife where no
testimony as to wife's need was before the court
on appeal on judgment roll from the decree of
no cause of action in husband and awarding of
expenses of suit, attorney's fees and temporary
alimony to wife. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353,
179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
Court should have made findings regarding
need for reimbursement and ability to pay
when one party sought reimbursement of accounting costs that had been incurred in prosecuting the action. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855
P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Attorney fees.
Where decree of divorce was obtained by

mother of minor children against father, who
was required to pay certain sum periodically for
support, care, maintenance, and education of
such children, and he, without sufficient cause,
refused to comply with decree, as result of
which mother was compelled to bring proceedings against him, father was required to pay
counsel fees in such proceedings. Tribe v. Tribe,
59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921).
Court properly awarded attorney's fees to
wife in subsequent proceeding on application of
wife for arrears in alimony. Christensen v.
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925).
While fact that wife is able to pay expenses of
defending husband's divorce suit or to obtain
credit therefor should be considered by court in
determining whether to make award for expenses of suit and amount thereof, such fact
alone does not show that award is unjustified,
and consequently fact that award to wife for
expenses of defending suit was made after
expenses were paid or credit extended therefor
did not render award erroneous as showing
that she had no need therefor. Weiss v. Weiss,
111 Utah 353,179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
Although there was no detailed presentation
of facts establishing the usual requisite factors
to support an award of attorney's fees, trial
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
attorney fees to plaintiff to enable her to prosecute an action to enforce a provision of the
divorce decree where the facts implicit in the
proceeding and the evidence necessarily presented to the trial court, together with the de
minimis nature of the award, constituted a
sufficient basis to sustain the exercise of trial
court's discretion. Beardall v. Beardall, 629 P.2d
425 (Utah 1981).
Trial court properly denied wife's request for
attorney fees in divorce proceeding where she
offered no evidence at trial to show the nature
or amount of any attorney fees incurred or any
need for court-ordered assistance in the payment of such fees. Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d
684 (Utah 1982).
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The decision to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings rests primarily in the sound
discretion of the trial, court. However, the
award must be based on evidence of both financial need and reasonableness. Rasband v.
Rasband, 752 R2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Attorney fees may be awarded in actions for
the support and maintenance of children, including actions for the modification of child
custody. The decision to award such fees lies
within the trial court's discretion. Maughan v.
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Either party to a divorce action may be ordered to pay the adverse party to prosecute or
defend the action. This includes attorney fees
incurred on appeal. Maughan v. Maughan, 770
P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In order to award attorney fees, the trial
court must find the requesting party in need of
financial assistance and that the fees requested
are reasonable. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788
P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Haumont v.
Haumont, 793 R2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
Because the income to wife was uncertain
and she had no other source of income and
because husband had received a larger portion
of the marital estate, husband was to pay wife's
legal fees. Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943
(Utah 1993).
—Appeal.
Ex-husband who unsuccessfully appealed
trial court's ruling on an alimony reduction
action was required to pay the appeal costs and
ex-wife's attorney fees for defending on appeal.
Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978).
Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been
awarded below to the party who then prevails
on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that
party on appeal. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
When allegations of fact supporting a claim
of attorney fees on appeal are not a matter of
record and have not been adjudicated by a
finder of fact, the appellate court will remand
the claim for determination of whether the
party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal, and
if so, the amount of fees to be awarded.
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
—Award to attorney not permitted.
It was error for the district court to amend a
divorce decree to order the payment of attorney
fees directly to the wife's attorney. McDonald v.
McDonald, 866 R2d 1253 (Utah Ct. App 1993).

—Contesting petition for modification.
A reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded a
wife who contests a modification petition where
the custody of children is involved. Anders.^ ^
Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962)!
—Need.
It was an abuse of discretion for trial court to
award attorney fees to mother in child custody
modification proceeding where there was no
presentation of facts establishing her financial
need for such an award. Kallas v. Kallas, 614
P.2d 641 (Utah 1980).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering each party to pay his or her own
attorney fees, where neither party reasonably
had the ability to pay the other party's attorney
fees. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct
App. 1990).
Wife who did not prevail on any of the issues
she brought on appeal and did not establish
financial need on the record was denied attorney fees on appeal. Haumont v. Haumont, 793
P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
An award of attorney fees must be based on
evidence of the financial need of the receiving
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay,
and the reasonableness of the requested fees.
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Since the legislature has not placed a prohiwhen determining whether to award attorney
fees and costs, a trial court is not precluded as
a matter of law from considering the income of
a receiving parent's new spouse when determining the receiving parent's "need" for costs
and attorney fees. Crockett v. Crockett, 836
P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Since the trial court, in awarding attorney
fees, did not address the reasonableness of the
fees, and stopped short of finding that each
party would have the means to pay his own fees
out of the money being distributed to both, the
award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Because the proffered evidence of the wife's
attorney's fees was adequate and entirely undisputed, the court abused its discretion in
reducing the requested amount without a finding that the deduction was warranted by one of
the established factors upon which a court is
required to base its award. Muir v. Muir, 841
P.2d 736 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
When an award of attorney fees is based on
need, the trial court must support the award
with adequate findings detailing the reasonableness of the amount awarded and the need
of the receiving party. Finlayson v. Finlayson,
874 R2d 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
—Reasonable.
Allowance of $200 as wife's attorney's fee in
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divorce proceeding was not inadequate even
though husband was worth approximately
$40,000, where proceedings from time of commencement until entry of decree lasted less
than two months and trial itself was completed
in less than two days Blair v Blair, 40 Utah
306,121 P 19, 38 L R A (n s ) 269, 1914D Ann
Cas 989(1912)
Fifty dollars was a reasonable fee where wife
petitioned to require husband to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt for
failure to pay support money and husband filed
cross-petition for modification of decree and
where it was shown that wife was without
means to prosecute the cause or pay counsel
Scott v Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P2d 198
(1943)
In divorce cases, an award of attorney's fees
must be supported by evidence which shows
that the requested award is reasonable and
which establishes the financial need of the
party requesting the award, relevant factors of
reasonableness include the necessity of the
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of
the case and the result accomplished, and the
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in
the community Beals v Beals, 682 P2d 862
(Utah 1984), Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P 2d
1276 (Utah 1987)
An award of attorney fees to the wife was
reasonable where the evidence showed that the
wife needed assistance, the husband had initiated the divorce proceedings, requiring the wife
to hire an attorney, the husband was very well
supported by his family, and the wife had
worked for only four months before the couple
separated Walther v Walther 709 P2d 387
(Utah 1985)
An award of attorney fees was proper where
the record showed the wife's need based upon
the fact that her monthly expenses exceeded
her monthly income and the attorney testified
to the reasonableness of his fees Sinclair v
Sinclair, 718 P2d 396 (Utah 1986)
Attorney's lien on alimony.
Where wife in divorce action agreed to pay
fee to attorney who was allowed reasonable fee
payable by husband, and attorney had order
entered requiring husband to pay alimony to
clerk of court to be withdrawn by wife or her
attorney, and attorney in accordance with his
claim of lien withdrew balance of his fee from
alimony paid to clerk, court order requiring him
to return such money was void, since attorney
had hen on alimony, and wife was liable for his
fee even in absence of special agreement
Hampton v Hampton, 85 Utah 338, 39 P2d 703
(1935)
C o n t e m p t proceedings.
In contempt proceeding for failure to comply

30-3-3

with divorce decree, findings that husband had
not paid realty taxes and had not paid plaintiff
amount allowed for attorney's fees were insufficient to support adjudication of contempt,
since decree said nothing about taxes and provided for payment of attorney's fees to attorney
Openshaw v Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 P2d
191 (1935)
Costs and e x p e n s e s on appeal.
The Supreme Court may determine whether
additional counsel fees should be allowed, and
may allow costs of appeal to appellant, such as
filing fees, printing costs and the like Dahlberg
v Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P 214 (1930)
Upon appeal by defendant husband from
judgment that he was m arrears of alimony and
in which he sought modification of decree, wife,
who was allowed $25 for expense of printing
brief on appeal, was allowed further sum of
$100 as costs, including her attorney's fees
Hendncks v Hendricks 91 Utah 564, 65 P2d
642 (1937)
Wife was entitled to allowance for expenses
incurred on her appeal from judgment granting
husband divorce, including reasonable attorney
fees, where wife was not working, had no
means of her own and had been partially supported by her parents for number of years
Peterson v Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P2d
961 (1948)
Discretion of trial court.
Allowance of alimony and expenses of divorce
trial, including attorneys fees, are largely matters within discretion of court which tries case
Burtt v Burtt, 59 Utah 457, 204 P 91 (1922)
The reasonableness of the amount of the
attorney's fee is a matter largely within the
discretion of the trial court Openshaw v
Openshaw, 80 Utah 9 12 P2d 364 (1932)
Allowance of temporary alimony and suit
money is based on necessity of recipient, and
such allowance as well as amount thereof is
largely matter within sound discretion of trial
court Weiss v Weiss 111 Utah 353 179 P2d
1005 (1947)
Former section did not contemplate that
awards for expenses of suit or for temporary
alimony should be made only in those cases
where "adverse party usually wife) is destitute or practically so but contemplated such
awards when, in sound discretion of court,
circumstances of parties are such that in fairness to wife she should be given financial assistance by her husband in her prosecution or
defense of divorce action and for her support
during its pendency Weiss v Weiss 111 Utah
353 179 P2d 1005(1947;
Both the decision to a v. ard attorne\ fees and
the amount of such fee* are within the sound
discretion of the trial court Crouse \ Crouse,
817 P2d 836 (Utah Ct App 1991)
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Court should use its sound discretion in determining whether to award costs based on
need and ability to pay * Peterson v Peterson,
818 P2d 1305 (Utah Ct App 1991)
It is within court's discretion to define costs
as those reasonable amounts that are reasonably expended to prosecute or defend a divorce
action Peterson v Peterson, 818 P2d 1305
(Utah Ct App 1991)
Trial court was within its discretion in concluding that the costs of the action included a
custody evaluation, polygraph examination, expert witness fees, service fees, and copying
charges Peterson v Peterson, 818 P2d 1305
(Utah Ct App 1991)
Because court's findings failed to demonstrate that an award was arrived at after
proper consideration of the relevant factors for
determining the reasonableness of attorney fee
awards, the award was an abuse of discretion
Rappleye v Rappleye, 855 P2d 260 (Utah Ct
App 1993)
Enforcement of order or decree.
Enforcement, by citation or an order to show
cause or by contempt proceedings, of orders or
decrees with respect to payment of monthly or
other specific periods of alimony and counsel
fees, for a failure and willful refusal to pay
same, is one of the inherent equity powers of
the court Herzog v Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23
P2d 345 (1933)
Jurisdiction.
Fact that district court had no jurisdiction of
status of marriage between parties to husband's divorce action, because of noncompliance with residence requirement of § 30-3-1,
had no effect on and did not preclude award to
wife for temporary alimony, expenses of suit
and attorney's fees Weiss v Weiss, 111 Utah
353, 179 P 2d 1005(1947)
Mandamus.
District court had jurisdiction of petition
seeking enforcement of payment of alimony and
counsel fees as required by divorce decree and
court's view that it had no jurisdiction until
determination of validity of alleged settlement
was improper, so that mandamus issued to
compel court to proceed with the cause Herzog
v Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23 P2d 345 (1933)
If order to show cause is improperly refused,
the judge may be required by peremptory writ
of mandate to issue such order Mann v
Morrison, 102 Utah 282, 130 P2d 286 (1942)
Where defendant wife bnngs a proceeding for
writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of an
order to show cause why plaintiff husband

should not pay temporary alimony, suit money
and attorney's fees, the Supreme Court may
make a determination of the sufficiency of the
allegations to require the order Anderson v
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P2d 252 (1943)
Order of court.
An order directing payment of attorney's fees
to plaintiff's attorney is void, because it runs in
favor of the attorney, who is not a party to the
action or proceeding Openshaw v Openshaw
80 Utah 9, 12 P2d 364 (1932)
Upon a proper application, lower court will
issue an order as a matter of course to plaintiff
husband to show cause why he should not pay
temporary alimony, suit money and attorney
fees But where motion was denied, Supreme
Court will not examine affidavits in support of
motion to see whether a sufficient showing was
made, at least where there is no showing that
the refusal to grant the order was prejudicial
Anderson v Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P2d
252 (1943)
Stipulation and effect thereof.
Where husband, by stipulation pnor to trial
in his divorce action, recognized wife's nght to
temporary alimony and agreed to $50 per
month or such greater sum as court might fix,
trial court did not err in awarding temporary
alimony, at end of trial, in amount of $75 per
month from commencement of action to entry of
decree Weiss v Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P2d
1005 (1947)
Fact that stipulation between parties prior to
trial m divorce action by husband provided for
latter to pay $100 as attorney's fees to enable
wife to defend action did not preclude trial
court from awarding additional sum therefor
even at end of trial after legal services had been
rendered, since wife did not agree to receive
stipulated amount as complete and final settlement of all her claims for attorney's fees Weiss
v Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P2d 1005 (1947)
Temporary alimony.
Trial courts have equitable powers to award
temporary alimony during the pendencv of a
petition to modify and the trial court erred in
not considering plaintiff's motion for temporary
alimony pending the hearing on her petition
Wells v Wells, 871 P2d 1036 (Utah Ct App
1994)
Cited in Hoagland v Hoagland, 852 P2d
1025 (Utah Ct App 1993), Willey v Willey, 866
P2d 547 (Utah Ct App 1993), Osguthorpe v
Osguthorpe, 872 P2d 1057 (Utah Ct App
1994)
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and
Separation §§ 558-623
C.J.S. — 27B C J S Divorce §§ 306-368
A.L.R. — Contract, provision thereof, or
stipulation waiving wife's right to counsel fees
m event of divorce or separation action, 3
A L R 3d 716
Necessity and sufficiency of notice and hearmg as to allowance of suit money or counsel fees
in divorce or other marital action, 10 A L R 3d
280
Wife's nght to award of counsel fees in final
divorce judgment of trial or appellate court as
affected by fact that judgment was rendered
against her, 32 A L R 3d 1227
Amount of attorneys' fees m matters mvolving domestic relations, 59 A L R 3d 152
Wife's possession of independent means as
affecting her right to alimony pendente lite, 60
A L R.3d 728
Authority of divorce court to award prospec-

tive or anticipated attorneys' fees to enable
parties to maintain or defend divorce suit, 22
A L R 4th 407
Adequacy or excessiveness of amount of
money awarded as temporary alimony, 26
A L R 4th 1218
Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after
absolute divorce, for modification of child custody or support order, 57 A L R 4th 710
Power to modify spousal support award for a
limited term, issued in conjunction with divorce, so as to extend the term or make the
award permanent, 62 A L R 4th 180
Death of obligor spouse as affecting alimony,
79 A L R 4th 10
Divorce spouse's right to order that other
spouse pay expert witness fees, 4 A L R 5th
403
Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees
in domestic relations cases, 17 A L R 5th 366.
Key Numbers. — Divorce <$=> 208-229

30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the plaintiff or
plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause.
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or children and the
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be administered, a decree of divorce
may not be granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course
provided in Section 30-3-11 3 and have presented a certificate of course
completion to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own
motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall
make and file findings and decree upon the evidence.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L.
1909, ch. 60, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961,
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116,
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1;

1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch.
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective February 11, 1991, substituted
"Section 78-3-31" for "Section 78-3-3 1" in the
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30-3-4.1

HUSBAND AND WIFE

or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703.
Nunc pro tunc: entering judgment or decree
of divorce nunc pro tunc, 19 A.L.R.3d 648.
Vacating or setting aside divorcfe decree after
remarriage of party, 17 A.L.R.4th 1153.
Necessity that divorce court value property
before distributing it, 51 A.L.R.4th 11.

Authority of court, upon entering default
judgment, to make orders for child custody or
support which were not specifically requested
in pleadings of prevailing party, 5 A.L.R.5th
863.
Key Numbers. — Divorce «=» 88, 152.

30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch.
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment,

authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court commissioners, effective April 23, 1990.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
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the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
History: R-S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1;
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993,
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1991 amendment effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts
or obligations in the mtroductory paragraph of
Subsection (1), added Subsection (l)(c), and
inserted "and obligations for debts" near the
end of Subsection (3).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 152, effective
May 3, 1993, substituted "members of the immediate family" for "relatives" and "best inter-

est" for "welfare" in Subsection (4); substituted
"shall* for "may" and inserted "or defended
against" in Subsection (7); added Subsection
(8); and made stylistic changes.
The 1993 amendment by ch. 261, effective
January 1, 1994, inserted "or becomes" in Subsection (1Kb), added Subsections (l)(d) and
(l)(e), and made related stylistic changes.
T h e 1 9 9 4 a m e n d m e n t ) effective May 2, 1994,
d e s i g n a t e d Subsection (4) as (4Xa) and added
Subsection (4)(b).
~
„ .
^
,
. , . ..
. < ^ R e f e r e n c e s . - Grandparents visitatl0n ngnts
30 5 2
' *
' " '
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Title 30,
Chapter 8.
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Tab 3

78-45-7.5

JUDICIAL CODE

History: C. 1963, 78-46-7.4, enacted J>y L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6; 1994, ch. 118, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
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ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base
combined child support obligation" for "child
support award."

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance;
and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly
income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax
returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community.
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(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents* minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994,
ch. 118, § 7.

Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection
(5)(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Deductible expenses.
Findings by court.
Imputed income.
Social Security benefits.
Cited.
Deductible expenses.
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt
with as a matter of law under this section; the
deductibility of particular expenses poses a
question of fact, turning on whether such expenses are necessary, and, if so, whether they
exceed those required for the business's operation at a reasonable level. Bingham v.
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Findings by court.
Although a trial court entered findings required by Subsection 7(b), since the trial court
failed to enter any findings required under
Subsection (7)(a), the findings on the whole
were insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 R2d 1018
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Imputed income.
Even though the court's findings of fact did
not include a specific finding that ex-husband
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced
to the imputation of income at the trial level
and because his job history and current employment options inarguably supported this imputation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income in an amount greater
than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v.
Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Social Security benefits.
A trial court may, in its discretion, consider a
child's receipt of Social Security benefits
against the parent's child support obligation.
However, a trial court may not order that those
Social Security benefits be subject to legal process. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
Cited in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTATTG ^
ETYT:_
DALE P. HOLT

:

Plaintiff,

:

RULING

vs.

:

Civil No. 934700554

VICKIE L. HOLT,

:

Defendant.

The Court took under advisement several issues. These include
valuation of the plaintiffs business, alimony, determination of the plaintiffs income
for purposes of child support, tax exemption awards, attorney's fees and costs. The
Court will address each issue separately.
Business Valuation
The estimates of value on the plaintiffs business were varied. They
ranged from $2.8 million to $11 million. They included values of $2.8 million, $5.4
million, $9 million and $11 million. The Court finds the value of the business to be
$2.8 million. It is the most reasonable determination of the fair market value of the
business. In addition, the Court finds that any goodwill in this case is personal to the
plaintiff and is not subject to distribution to the defendant as part of the marital estate.
Quite frankly, it doesn't make any sense to sell the business. It has
been extremely successful. Both parties would be better off financially if the business
were maintained. It also doesn't make much sense to require the plaintiff and

^

J;:

-

'^

defendant to become business partners after their divorce, since they weren't business
partners during their marriage. The plaintiff is awarded the business. The defendant
is awarded $1.4 million as her half of the business.
The best approach is for the plaintiff to buy the defendant's share of the
business. The plaintiff has submitted a proposed buy-out plan. (See Exhibit P8)
Unfortunately, the plan submitted by the plaintiff is based on the premise that any
transfer to the defendant should account for possible future income tax consequences.
It shouldn't. Any tax consequences are deferred until assets are sold. This may or
may not occur. There is no income tax on the division of a marital estate.
The Court is not compelling a sale of the business. (Although the
parties have the option to consider a sale.) The Court will allow the parties to present
proposed buy-out plans. It is the Court's intention that the buy-out occur as soon as
possible.
Alimony
This is a long term marriage. The parties have been married for almost
22 years. Both parties are in their early forties.
During the marriage, the defendant worked outside the home until she
had her first child. She has not worked outside the home for the last 16 years. She
has a high school education and has had no further courses or training. She has no
intention of going back to either work or school. She wants to stay home and take
care of the children.
The plaintiff has spent the greater part of the marriage building the
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business into an extremely successful enterprise. He has received local and national
recognition for his business practices. There is no reason to believe he cannot
continue to be successful, subject of course, to the uncertainties of the future and his
eventual retirement.
The plaintiff is extremely talented and successful. And, although he
should not be punished economically for either his talent or success, the defendant has
also made important contributions to the parties' financial well being. She too, should
share in the economic success. Even though both parties will be awarded substantial
material assets, plaintiffs assets are income producing and will continue to grow. On
the other hand, the assets received by the defendant are less capable of producing
substantial income. By awarding the plaintiff the business, his ability to produce
income is enhanced. As such, the plaintiff is in a position to provide support to the
defendant.
Both parties submitted their monthly expenses. The plaintiffs expenses,
with one or two exceptions are both reasonable and necessary. The expenses
submitted by the defendant seem somewhat excessive, although the Court finds that she
does have significant monthly expenses. To find that either side is in economic "need"
of alimony, given their material assets, is difficult. However, to award the plaintiff
the greater income producing property and then not equalize incomes to a certain
extent seems extremely unfair.
Finally, in looking at the ability of the defendant to provide support for
herself, the Court must consider, among other factors, the standard of living the
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parties acquired during their marriage. Even though both parties acquired substantial
assets during the marriage, their divorce has divided those assets in half. Without
assistance from the plaintiff, the defendant will not be able to maintain her same
standard of living. The defendant is in some need of assistance.
In order to equalize the income of the parties and to maintain the parties
standard of living during the marriage, an award of alimony is appropriate. The Court
awards $2,000 per month permanent alimony to the defendant. It is subject to
termination upon the defendant's remarriage or co-habitation. It is subject to
modification only upon a material change of circumstances by either party.
Plaintiff's income
Determining the amount of plaintiffs income for the purposes of
computing child support was the most difficult issue. The Court received evidence
that the plaintiff had a historical income of approximately $80,000 per year. In
addition, the Court received evidence that the plaintiff was worth $140,000.00. The
Court also heard evidence that the plaintiff could also be worth upwards of
$250,000.00 a year. The best evidence upon which to base the child support
calculation is to $80,000.00 a year income figure. It is consistent with the parties
historical yearly income. Although the plaintiff could readily increase or decrease this
amount, the evidence is consistent that the amount family income remained constant.
Tax Exemptions
Traditionally, income tax exemptions belong to the custodial parent.
The Court can, under certain circumstances, order the custodial parent to release those
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exemptions to the non-custodial parent. In this instance, the defendant is the custodial
parent.

However, the plaintiff or non-custodial parent meets all the criteria justifying

a transfer of those exemptions. The plaintiff has a higher income. In addition, the
plaintiff provides the majority of the support for the children. Although there are tax
advantages to both parties, given the substantial difference in income and child support
obligations, the Court finds that a release of the exemptions in this case would be in
the best interest of the children and the parties. The plaintiff is awarded the tax
exemptions for the children beginning in 1994. Needless to say, the plaintiff must be
current on his child support payments to claim the exemptions.
Attorney's Fees and Court Costs
In examining attorney's fees, the Court looks at the parties' ability to
pay attorney's fees, as well as their need to have their attorney's fees paid. The Court
also looks at which party prevailed on any contested legal issues at trial. In making an
award of attorney's fees, the Court look at the financial circumstances of both parties.
In this instance, both parties have the assets, income and ability to pay their own
attorney's fees. Neither party substantially prevailed on all or most of the contested
legal issues. In fact, on the two major issues; valuation of the business and alimony,
different parties prevailed. The plaintiff prevailed on the valuation issue and the
defendant prevailed on the alimony issue. Each party is ordered to pay their own
attorney's fees.
With one exception, each party is to bear their own court costs. Since
the plaintiff prevailed on the issue concerning evaluation of the parties' business, the
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defendant is ordered to pay plaintiffs costs for hiring experts to determine the
business' value.
Plaintiffs counsel will please prepare findings of facts, conclusions of
law and a divorce decree consistent with this ruling. Please submit to opposing
counsel, for approval as to form, prior to submission to the Court for signature.
One final note: the Court apologizes for the delay in getting this
decision written. With the Annual Bar conference in Sun Valley, one week's vacation,
Judge Johnson's retirement and Judge Baldwin's hospitalization, the Court has been
swamped.
Dated this ^ftA day of August, A.D., 1994.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDG
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Ruling, postage prepaid on the3(lc\ day of August, 1994, to the following:
Ann Wassermann
426 South 500 East
SLC, UT 84102

David Paul White
5278 Pinemont Dr.
Suite A200
Murray, UT 84123

Ronald C. Barker
2870 South State
SLC, UT 84115-3692

Deputy Clerk
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ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE E. HOLT,
Plaintiff,

:
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

:

VICKIE L. HOLT,

:

Defendant.

: Case No. 93470055 DA
: Judge W. Brent West
ooOoo

This matter came on for trial on June 13, 14, and 15,
1994, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding. Both parties appeared
in person and were represented by counsel.

The Court having heard

the testimony of the witnesses, having examined the exhibits and
all

evidence, having

issued

its ruling, and

having

ruled

on

ancillary matters subsequent to the trial at a hearing held on
November 5, 1994, and the Court being fully advised, now makes and
enters the following Findings of Fact:

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff was a resident of Davis County, State of

Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of the
complaint in this action.
2.

Pursuant to Stipulation of the parties, this matter

was bifurcated and a Decree dissolving the marital relationship
between the parties was entered on or about June 13, 1994.

All

remaining issues were reserved for final determination.
3.

The parties are the parents of three minor children.

It is reasonable that the parties be granted the joint legal
custody of the three minor children.

The Plaintiff should be

designed the primary physical custodian of the oldest child, with
the Defendant being designated the primary physical custodian of
the two youngest children.
4.

The Court finds that the children should be able to

spend as much time with both parents as possible.

Each parent is

entitled, at a minimum, to visitation with any child not in their
primary physical care in accordance with the Utah statutory minimum
schedule for visitation. The parties should cooperate in effecting
visitation, although the children should be entitled to participate
in decisions with regard to their activities and the visitation.
Because of the work schedule and travel demands of the Plaintiff,
the Defendant should be flexible in terms of designating a day
2

during

the week

for

such visitation.

The Plaintiff

should,

however, give some reasonable advance notification of the day
during the week that he wishes to see the children so as to
accommodate the schedules of the children and of the Defendant.
The

Plaintiff

should

also

be

allowed

to

rearrange

weekend

visitation so as to accommodate his travel schedule, but he should
give the Defendant two weeks notice of any requests that weekends
be traded.
5.

The physical custodian should give the non-physical

custodian parent an opportunity to provide care for the children
during any substantial periods of time that the physical custodian
will be unable to provide care for the children.
6.

The

parties

are

mutually

restrained

from

threatening, harassing, or annoying each other, or from making
disparaging remarks to the children about the other parent.

The

Plaintiff should specifically be allowed to pull into the driveway
at the Defendant's residence in order to pick-up and deliver the
children, and he should not be deemed to be in violation of any
restraining or protective order for doing so.
7.

The Court finds, for the purpose of calculating

child support, that the gross annual income of the Plaintiff is
approximately $80,000 per year. This figure is consistent with the
historical

annual

income

of

the
3

parties.

The

Defendant

is

unemployed.

Based upon the current circumstances of the parties,

the Plaintiff should pay child support to the Defendant, effective
upon the entry of this Order, in the monthly amount of $997, which
amount is reflective of the split custodial arrangement and the
current incomes of the parties.
8.
the Plaintiff
children.

The Court finds that there is good cause to award to
all of the income tax exemptions for the minor

The justification for this finding includes, but is not

limited, the fact that the Plaintiff has a higher income, provides
a majority of support for the children, and can derive greater tax
advantage from use of the exemptions. The Court further finds that
an award of the exemptions to the Plaintiff would be in the best
interests of the children.

The Plaintiff, therefore, should be

awarded the income tax exemptions for all of the minor children of
the parties, provided, however, that the Plaintiff should not be
entitled to take the exemptions for any year in which he is not
current in all child support payments.
9.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has been timely

in his payment of temporary child support, and good cause exists
for a waiver of the mandatory income withholding provisions of Utah
law.

In the event the Plaintiff becomes delinquent in the payment

of child support, the Defendant should be entitled to an order of
automatic income withholding.
4

10.

The Plaintiff

should be required to maintain a

policy of health and medical insurance for the benefit of all the
minor children. The parties should share equally the costs of such
insurance, any deductibles, or any costs incurred not covered by
such insurance.
11.

The Plaintiff

should be required to maintain a

policy of life insurance in a face amount sufficient to insure the
payment of his child support obligation for the benefit of the
minor children, with the Defendant as the trustee.

Any life

insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children above and
beyond such coverage should be at the sole option of the Plaintiff,
and he should be entitled to designate as trustee any person whom
he chooses.
12.

There are certain policies of life insurance on the

life of the Defendant.

To the extent that she wants to keep

enforce such insurance coverage, she may assume the policies, but
she should be responsible for payment of any premiums associated
therewith.
13.

The Defendant made certain claims with respect to

Willowcreek and Oakridge Country Club memberships. With respect to
the Willowcreek membership, the Court finds that the membership has
already

been

sold

and

the proceeds

divided

equally, and

the

Defendant has no existing claim to any additional compensation.
5

With

regard

to

the

Oakridge

Country

Club

membership,

that

membership is owned by the Plaintiff's business, Codale Electric,
Inc., and the value of the membership has been figured into the
valuation of the business as set forth herein.

The Court finds

there is no basis to require the Plaintiff to purchase a membership
for the benefit of the Defendant.
14.

During

the course

of

the marriage

acquired various items of personal property.

the

parties

Several of the items

have been divided by the parties, and each should be awarded those
items in their possession, with the following exceptions.

There

are eight items in dispute, which should be divided equally between
the parties.

Counsel for the parties should arrange a mechanism

whereby one or the other of the parties is entitled to the first
choice, with the items being picked alternately by Plaintiff and
Defendant.

The items to be divided in this manner are as follows:

Sony 2 7" TV, contents of wall unit, TV cabinet, encyclopedia,
washer, dryer, lawn furniture, and snow blower.
15.

During the course of the marriage the Plaintiff

acquired ownership of 97.6% of the outstanding stock in Codale
Electric Supply, Inc.

The Court considered extensive evidence

regarding the value of the business.

The Plaintiff's expert, Mr.

Dave Dorton, testified that the value of one hundred percent of the
stock of the business is $2.8 million dollars.
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The Defendant's

expert testified as to values ranging from a liquidation value of
$2.8 million dollars to valuations of $11 million dollars.

The

Court finds convincing and persuasive the testimony of the expert
for the Plaintiff.

The experts appear to be in agreement that the

value of the company without the services of Dale Holt, or in the
absence

of

a

long

term

employment

agreement, is $2.8 million dollars.

contract

or

non-compete

The Court finds that the

company, by itself, has basically no good-will, and that the goodwill of the business is attributable to Mr. Holt as an individual.
The value of the 97.6% interest owned by the marital estate is
$2,732,000.
16.

The Court does not find that it is reasonable, as

Defendant has requested, to sell the business.

Furthermore, it is

not reasonable to allow the Defendant to retain one-half of the
parties'

stock

in Codale, as the Court

finds

this would

be

detrimental to the conduct of the business. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the parties, in conjunction with the business itself,
should

arrive

at a plan to acquire

the

Defendant's

one-half

interest in the shares owned by the parties in a manner so as to
minimize tax consequences as much as possible to the Defendant, but
allow the business to function properly.
17.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have

acquired various additional assets, the values of which have been
7

stipulated by the parties or of which are not in dispute.

The

Court finds that as of the date of the hearing in this matter these
assets are as follows:

personal residence located in Bountiful,

Utah valued at $153,000; Codale Electric Supply, Inc., stock value
$2,732,000;

Holt

Properties

Partnership

$360,488;

Individual

Retirement Account, $20,323; 401(k) retirement account $89,789;
Retirement Plan $133,109; and Note payable $16,000.
liability

The only

of the marital estate is the sum of $23,250, which

represents the income taxes payable.
above values

do

not

include

The Court notes that the

the personal

possessions

of

the

parties, including household furnishings, jewelry, and automobiles.
It is reasonable that the parties each receive one-half of the net
value of the marital estate.
18.

After subtracting the income taxes payable in the

amount of $23,250 from the marital estate (and the Court hereby
finds that the Plaintiff should be responsible to insure that the
income taxes are paid), each of the parties is entitled to assets
totalling $1,740,639.

The Court finds that the assets should be

distributed as follows:
To the Defendant:
Personal Residence
IRA Account
401(k) Retirement Account
Retirement Plan
Buy Out of Codale Shares to Equalize
Assets
8

$

153,000
20,323
89,7 89
133,109

1,344,509

To the Plaintiff:
Codale Electric Supply, Inc. Stock

100% of stock
owned by the
parties
360,488

Holt Properties Partnership
Note Payable
19.
Inc.,

The Defendant's stock in Codale Electric Supply,

should

follows:

16,000

be

redeemed

by

the corporation

or purchased

as

an initial payment of $500,000 should be made to the

Defendant no later than 60 days from the entry of these Findings
and Order.

Within one year from the due date for the first

payment, an additional amount in the amount of $422,254 shall be
made, together with interest accrued thereon from the date the
initial payment was due at the rate of 4% per annum.

The final

payment

one

of

$422,254

should

be

made

no

later

than

year

thereafter, together with interest on that installment at the rate
of 4% per annum, said interest accruing from the date the first
payment was made.
20.
party

pay

resulting

any
from

The Court finds that it is reasonable that each
income
a

sale

tax
of

liability, including capital gains,
any

assets

awarded

to

that

party,

specifically including funds paid to the Defendant for the purchase
of her shares in Codale Electric Supply, Inc. With respect to the
redemption of the shares of Codale, the Defendant is ordered to pay

9

any tax liability assessed, and to indemnify the Plaintiff and hold
him harmless with regard to such tax consequences.
21.

The parties acquired a 1979 MGB automobile, which is

currently held in storage. The automobile should be sold, with the
parties sharing equally the proceeds.

In addition, the Defendant

has in her possession a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a
1987 BMW M6, valued at $19,250.

Both of those automobiles are

owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc.

The Defendant is hereby

awarded the automobiles, subject to her obligation to reimburse the
corporation for the value of the cars.

The value of the cars may

be deducted from the initial $500,000 payment, if the Defendant so
desires.
22.

Any interest accrued in the IRA, Retirement account,

or 401(k) account from the hearing in this matter through the date
of distribution should be divided equally by the parties.
23.

As of the trial in this matter, the parties had been

married almost 22 years. Both parties are in their early forties.
The Defendant has not been employed outside of the home for the
last sixteen years, and has stated an intention not to go to work
or back to school.

The Plaintiff has worked during the marriage

and is a successful businessman.

Although the Defendant has not

worked in the business, she has contributed to the financial wellbeing of the parties, and should share in the economic success.
10

Both parties will be awarded substantial assets in this matter.
The Court finds the assets awarded to the Plaintiff may produce
more income in the future than those awarded to the Defendant.
24.
With

one

or

Both parties have submitted statements of expenses.
two

exceptions,

reasonable and necessary.
seem excessive.

the

Plaintiff's

expenses

seem

The expenses alleged by the Defendant

The Court finds that, during the marriage, the

average monthly expenses of the family of five were in the range of
$3,800 to $4,200 for the last three that the family lived together
as a whole.
orders

During the period of the pendency of the temporary

of this Court, the Defendant

received

total

temporary

support for herself and two of the minor children in the amount of
$1,538 per month.

During the period of the temporary orders, the

Defendant did not incur any additional debt.
25.

The

Court

finds

that,

based

upon

current

circumstances, the cash payments to the Defendant could earn tax
free income at a rate of no less than six percent per annum.
26.

The

Court

appropriate in this case.

finds

that

indefinite

alimony

is

The Plaintiff should pay to Defendant

alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month from the entry of this
judgment.

Said alimony should terminate upon the Defendant's

cohabitation, remarriage, or death.

11

27.
and

expert

Both parties incurred substantial attorney's fees

witness

fees.

The

Court

finds

that,

with

the

distribution of assets, it is reasonable that each party pay their
own

attorney's

fees

and

costs.

Provided,

however, that

the

Defendant should pay the expert witness fees incurred by Plaintiff
in the approximate amount of $9,500.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters its Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A

final

Order

and

Judgment

should

enter

incorporating the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Court as
set forth herein.
DATED this

** * day of

TSJOVMHW

f

199S.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

12

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, this

/^r

day of December, 1994, to:

Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Defendant
Mr. David Paul White
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A200
Murray, Utah 84123

^yfyK
al2\holt.fof

13

Tab 6

Jo IJ :]29,".;,'35
^ ~Z

„

.7

' ' ""LE;"T/1T^"

ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE E. HOLT,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

v.

:

VICKIE L. HOLT,

:
Defendant.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

: Case No. 93470055 DA
: Judge W. Brent West
ooOoo

This matter came on for trial on June 13, 14, and 15,
1994, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding.
in person and were represented by counsel.

Both parties appeared
The Court having heard

the testimony of the witnesses, having examined the exhibits and
all

evidence,

having

issued

its ruling,

and having

ruled

on

ancillary matters subsequent to the trial at a hearing held on
November 5, 1994, and the Court being fully advised, and having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1,

1.

The parties are the parents of three minor children.

The parties are granted the joint legal custody of the three minor
children.

The Plaintiff shall be designed the primary physical

custodian of the oldest child, with the Defendant being designated
the primary physical custodian of the two youngest children.
2.

The children shall be able to spend as much time

with both parents as possible.

Each parent is entitled, at a

minimum, to visitation with any child not in their primary physical
care in accordance with the Utah statutory minimum schedule for
visitation.

The parties shall cooperate in effecting visitation,

although the children shall be entitled to participate in decisions
with regard to their activities and the visitation. Because of the
work schedule and travel demands of the Plaintiff, the Defendant
shall be flexible in terms of designating a day during the week for
such

visitation.

The

Plaintiff

shall,

however,

give

some

reasonable advance notification of the day during the week that he
wishes to see the children so as to accommodate the schedules of
the children and of the Defendant.

The Plaintiff shall also be

allowed to rearrange weekend visitation so as to accommodate his
travel schedule, but he shall give the Defendant two weeks notice
of any requests that weekends be traded.
3.

The physical custodian shall give the non-physical

custodian parent an opportunity to provide care for the children
2

during any substantial periods of time that the physical custodian
will be able to provide care for the children.
4.

The

parties

are

mutually

restrained

from

threatening, harassing, or annoying each other, or from making
disparaging remarks to the children about the other parent.

The

Plaintiff shall specifically be allowed to pull into the driveway
at the Defendant's residence in order to pick-up and deliver the
children, and he shall not be deemed to be in violation of any
restraining or protective order for doing so.
5.

Based upon the current circumstances of the parties,

the Plaintiff shall pay child support to the Defendant, effective
upon the entry of this Order, in the monthly amount of $997, which
amount is reflective of the split custodial arrangement and the
current incomes of the parties.
6.

The Plaintiff is awarded the income tax exemptions

for all of the minor children of the parties, provided, however,
that the Plaintiff shall not be entitled to take the exemptions for
any year in which he is not current in all child support payments.
7.

The Plaintiff has been timely in his payment of

temporary child support, and good cause exists for a waiver of the
mandatory income withholding provisions of Utah law.

In the event

the Plaintiff becomes delinquent in the payment of child support,

3

the Defendant shall be entitled to an order of automatic income
withholding.
8.

The Plaintiff shall be required to maintain a policy

of health and medical insurance for the benefit of all the minor
children.

The parties shall share equally the costs of such

insurance, any deductibles, or any costs incurred not covered by
such insurance.
9.

The Plaintiff shall be required to maintain a policy

of life insurance in a face amount sufficient to insure the payment
of his child

support obligation

for the benefit of the minor

children, with the Defendant as the trustee.

Any life insurance

coverage for the benefit of the minor children above and beyond
such coverage shall be at the sole option of the Plaintiff, and he
shall be entitled to designate as trustee any person whom he
chooses.
10.

There are certain policies of life insurance on the

life of the Defendant.

To the extent that she wants to keep

enforce such insurance coverage, she may assume the policies, but
she shall be responsible for payment of any premiums associated
therewith.
11.

The Defendant made certain claims with respect to

Willowcreek and Oakridge Country Club memberships. With respect to
the Willowcreek membership, that the membership has already been
4

sold and the proceeds divided equally, and the Defendant has no
existing claim to any additional compensation.

With regard to the

Oakridge Country Club membership, that membership is owned by the
Plaintiff's business, Codale Electric, Inc., and the value of the
membership has been figured into the valuation of the business as
set forth herein.

There is no basis to require the Plaintiff to

purchase a membership for the benefit of the Defendant.
12.

During

the course

of

the marriage

acquired various items of personal property.

the

parties

Several of the items

have been divided by the parties, and each shall be awarded those
items in their possession, with the following exceptions.

There

are eight items in dispute, which shall be divided equally between
the parties.

Counsel for the parties shall arrange a mechanism

whereby one or the other of the parties is entitled to the first
choice, with the items being picked alternately by Plaintiff and
Defendant.

The items to be divided in this manner are as follows:

Sony 27" TV, contents of wall unit, TV cabinet, encyclopedia,
washer, dryer, lawn furniture, and snow blower.
13.

The value of the 97.6% interest owned by the marital

estate is $2,732,000.
14.

The

parties,

in

conjunction

with

the

business

itself, shall arrive at a plan to acquire the Defendant's one-half
interest in the shares owned by the parties in a manner so as to
5

minimize tax consequences as much as possible to the Defendant, but
allow the business to function properly.
15.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have

acquired various additional assets, the values of which have been
stipulated by the parties or of which are not in dispute.

The

Court finds that as of the date of the hearing in this matter these
assets are as follows:

personal residence located in Bountiful,

Utah valued at $153,000; Codale Electric Supply, Inc., stock value
$2,732,000;

Holt

Properties

Partnership

$360,488;

Individual

Retirement Account, $20,323; 401(k) retirement account $89,789;
Retirement Plan $133,109; and Note payable $16,000.
liability

of the marital estate is the sum of $23,250, which

represents the income taxes payable.
above

The only

values

do

not

include

The Court notes that the

the personal

possessions

of

the

parties, including household furnishings, jewelry, and automobiles.
The parties shall each receive one-half of the net value of the
marital estate.
16.

After subtracting the income taxes payable in the

amount of $23,250 from the marital estate (and the Court hereby
finds that the Plaintiff shall be responsible to insure that the
income taxes are paid), each of the parties is entitled to assets
totalling $1,740,639.

The Court finds that the assets shall be

distributed as follows:

6

To the Defendant:
Personal Residence
IRA Account
401(k) Retirement Account
Retirement Plan
Buy Out of Codale Shares to Equalize
Assets

$

153,000
20,323
89,789
133,109

1,344,509

To the Plaintiff:
Codale Electric Supply, Inc. Stock
Holt Properties Partnership

100% of stock
owned by the
parties
360,488

Note Payable
17.

16,000

The Defendant's stock in Codale Electric Supply,

Inc., shall be redeemed by the corporation or purchased as follows:
an initial payment of $500,000 shall be made to the Defendant no
later than 60 days from the entry of these Findings and Order.
Within one year

from the due date for the first payment, an

additional amount in the amount of $422,254 shall be made, together
with interest accrued thereon from the date the initial payment was
due at the rate of 4% per annum.

The final payment of $422,254

shall be made no later than one year thereafter, together with
interest on that installment at the rate of 4% per annum, said
interest accruing from the date the first payment was made.
18.

Each party

shall pay any income tax liability,

including capital gains, resulting

from a sale of any assets

awarded to that party, specifically including funds paid to the
Defendant for the purchase of her shares in Codale Electric Supply,
7

Inc.

With respect to the redemption of the shares of Codale, the

Defendant is ordered to pay any tax liability assessed, and to
indemnify the Plaintiff and hold him harmless with regard to such
tax consequences.
19.

The parties acquired a 1979 MGB automobile, which is

currently held in storage.

The automobile shall be sold, with the

parties sharing equally the proceeds.

In addition, the Defendant

has in her possession a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a
1987 BMW M6, valued at $19,250.

Both of those automobiles are

owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc.

The Defendant is hereby

awarded the automobiles, subject to her obligation to reimburse the
corporation for the value of the cars.

The value of the cars may

be deducted from the initial $500,000 payment, if the Defendant so
desires.
20.

Any interest accrued in the IRA, Retirement account,

or 401(k) account from the hearing in this matter through the date
of distribution shall be divided equally by the parties.
21.

Indefinite alimony is appropriate in this case and

the Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant alimony in the amount of
$2,000 per month from the entry of this judgment.

Said alimony

shall terminate upon the Defendant's cohabitation, remarriage, or
death.

8

22.
and

expert

Both parties incurred substantial attorney's fees

witness

fees.

The

Court

finds

thatf

with

the

distribution of assets, each party shall pay their own attorney's
fees and costs.

Provided, however, that the Defendant shall pay

the expert witness fees incurred by Plaintiff in the approximate
amount of $9,500.
DATED this

4 ~ day of

VhrJwrt>l

, 199/.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER AND JUDGMENT, this [j^
of December, 1994, to:
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Defendant
Mr. David Paul White
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A200
Murray, Utah 84123
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ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE P. HOLT,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

v.

;

VICKI L. HOLT,

:
Defendant.

ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS

: Case No. 934700554 DA
: Judge W. Brent West
ooOoo

This matter came on for hearing on November 4, 1994, the
Honorable W. Brent West presiding.

The Plaintiff appeared in

person and was represented by counsel, Ann L. Wassermann, Esq. The
Defendant appeared personally and was represented by counsel David
Paul White, Esq. and Ronald C. Barker, Esq.

Before the Court were

various post-trial motions and requests for clarification filed on
behalf of both parties.

The Court having reviewed the pleadings

submitted by the parties, having heard the arguments of counsel,
and being fully advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1

1.

The MG automobile that is currently

in

storage

should be sold, with the parties to share equally the proceeds.
2.

The parties are to share equally any earnings in the

various retirement accounts accrued from the date of valuation as
presented to the Court at trial to the date of distribution.
3.

The parties are to share equally the costs of making

copies of the family photographs.
4.

The

Plaintiff's

proposal

with

regard

to

the

purchase/redemption of the Defendant's interest in Codale Electric
Supply, Inc., is hereby adopted by the Court. The Court finds that
the time periods for payment to the Defendant as proposed by the
Plaintiff are reasonable.
5.

The Defendant is responsible to pay any income tax

consequences incurred as result of the redemption/purchase of her
interest in Codale Electric Supply, Inc.

She should indemnify and

hold the Plaintiff harmless from any income tax liability for such
purchase.
6.

The Defendant's request that she receive the real

property owed by Holt Properties as a part of the distribution of
the marital estate is denied.
7.

Any amounts owed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant

with regard to the purchase of the Defendant's interest in Codale
Electric Supply, Inc., sh^ll accrue interest at the rate of four
2

percent (4%) per annum, which shall accrue on unpaid amounts from
the date of the first required payment (i.e. sixty days from the
date of entry of the fina?. order in this matter) until paid in
full.
8.

The request

for both parties to reconsider

the

alimony award is hereby denied.
9.

The Court does specifically find that, during the

period of time when the parties and their three children lived
together, their reasonable monthly expenses ranged between $3,800
and $4,200.
10.

The Court specifically finds that the cash assets

awarded to the Defendant, and the cash payments for her interest in
Codale Electric Supply, I^c, could reasonably be anticipated to
generate tax free income at an annual rate of no less than six
percent (6%).
11.

The motion to reconsider the Court's rulings with

regard to attorney's fees and expert witnesses fees is denied.
12.

The

Defendant

has

made

certain

claims

for

reimbursement of expenses pursuant to the temporary order in this
matter, which
hearing.

expenses

have accrued

through

the date

of

the

With regard to these claims, the Plaintiff is ordered to

reimburse the Defendant as follows:

3

a.

$89.19 for prescriptions for the benefit of the

b.

One-half of the cost of past therapy for the

minor children.

minor children.

Defendant is to bear the costs of her own therapy.

Any further therapy foi the children shall be evaluated by both
parties and a determination of the continued need and cost of
therapy shall be agreed upon.

In the absence of agreement, no

further costs shall be incurred,
c.
repair
repair.

$193.83

of the water

representing

softener, water

reimbursement

heater, and

for

the

refrigerator

The Defendant is ordered to assume responsibility for the

cost of lawn fertilizer, the purchase of yard plants and carpet
cleaning.
d.

$281.34

for reimbursement

for the

cost

of

certain yard maintenance, including deck stain, sprinkler parts,
and the lawn mower blade.

The Defendant is responsible for the

remaining costs, including the hot tub repair.
e.

$204.84 representing care maintenance.

The

Defendant is ordered to pay the registration fees of $310.00 and
the taxes on the BMW automobile.
f.

The Defendant is ordered to pay the property

taxes of $892.

4

g.
The

parties

should

Orthodontic expense is to be divided equally.
endeavor

to

obtain

a

contract

with

orthodontist, and should also explore insurance coverage.

the
The

parties should pay equally any costs not covered by insurance,
including any deductible or uninsured amounts.
13.

The Defendant's motion for an award of child support

for the month of August, 1994 is denied.
DATED this 20 U day of

5*rOUyW

1995.

BY THE COURT:

k &S- te§:
District Court Judge

5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS, this
1£

day of January,.1995, to:
Mr. David Paul White, Esq.
7434 South State, #102
Midvale, Utah 84 04 7
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorneys for Defendant
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David Paul White, #3441
Attorney for Defendant
7434 South State St. #102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone (801) 566-8188
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Co-Counsel for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
)

DEFENDANT'S URCP 59 MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS,
) CONCLUSIONS, ORDER AND
JUDGMENT, ORDER ON POST
) TRIAL MOTIONS, TO DISTRIBUTE
ADDITIONAL ASSETS OR FOR A NEW
) TRIAL

DALE P. HOLT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VICKIE

L. HOLT,
)

Civil No. 934700554 DA

Defendant.
) Judge W. Brent West
ooOoo

I
Defendant's additional Motions
Defendant also moves the Court for orders as follows.

h
Motion For a New Trial
1.

New trial - For a new trial based upon each of the

following grounds:

I

•- - - -

(a)
Accident

Accident
or

or

surprise,

surprise
which

-

Pursuant

ordinary

to

prudence

URCP

59(a) (3).

could

not

have

guarded against.
(b) Newlv discovered

evidence - Pursuant

to URCP

59(a) (4)

Newly discovered material evidence which defendant could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(c)

Inadequate

damages

-

Pursuant

to

URCP

59(a) (5).

to URCP

59(a) (6)

Inadequate damages.
(d) Insufficiency

of evidence - Pursuant

Insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision and/or because
the decision is against law, and/or
(e)

Error in law - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (7) .

Error in law.

1
Motion to Alter or Amend
2.

To alter or amend judgment and orders - Defendant also

moved the Court pursuant to URCP 59(e) for an order altering or
amending

said

Findings, Conclusions, Order

and/or

Judgment

and

Order on Post Trial Motions and other applicable judgments and/or
orders.

2

3.

Incorporation of prior motions by reference - Defendant

also hereby incorporates herein and re-alleges the contents of her
Motions and Memorandum entitled "Defendants Memorandum re Motion to
Correct ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or For a New
Trial" dated 11/3/94," which was entered herein on January 10,
1995, together with the exhibits and affidavits thereto,1 a copy of
which

is

attached

hereto

as Ex.

#1.

Although

said

motions

addressed the Court's Ruling, and were prepared prior to entry of
the Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on
Post Trial Motions, etc., since there was little change from the
Court's Ruling, the matters argued therein also apply to the
Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post
Trial Motions, etc. mentioned above. Reference thereon to the
Court's Ruling is hereby amended to refer to the Court's
Conclusions, Order and
4.

Findings,

Judgment, Order on Post Trial Motions, etc.

Order on Post Trial Motions purports to deny defendant7 s

11/3/94 motions which were reserved by the Court - At the 11/4/94
hearing, the Court declined to consider oral argument raised by
defendant's 11/3/94 motion, and invited defendant to bring those
matters before the Court after entry of the Findings, Conclusions
1

A copy of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum is attached

hereto as Ex. #1.
3

and Order.

To the extent that the "Order on Post Trial Motions"

purports to deny defendant's motions contained therein, defendant
moves the Court for an order vacating said order and permitting
oral

argument

of

the matters

asserted

in defendant's

11/3/94

motion, Exhibit #1 hereto.

Supporting Affidavits, Exhibits, Memorandum, etc.
5.

Supporting documents - The above-mentioned motions are

supported by this Memorandum of Authorities and by the affidavits
of defendant

(below), of Paul Shields,2 of Robert Hunter3 and by

exhibits thereto, together with testimony and exhibits received in
evidence at the trial of this matter.

1
Matters to which Defendant s Motions pertain
6.
Trial

Findings, Conclusions, Judgment & Orders, Order on Post

Motions,

etc.

to

which

defendants

motions

Defendant's motions pertain to the Court's

pertain

Findings

of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment entered in the aboveentitled matter about 1/10/95; also to the Court's Order on Post
Trial Motions entered herein about 1/25/95;

and generally to all

2

A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #2*

3

A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #3.
4

of the Courts orders and decisions with respect to distribution of
assets, payment of income taxes which may be incurred as a result
of the Court's decision, the award of alimony and child support,
payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees and costs, life
insurance, mandatory income withholding,

and to other orders which

pertain to financial matters.
Dated February 6, 1995.

DAVID PAUL WHITE and RONALD C. BARKER
Attorneys for defendant
By

, (FL«^JJ> £

SU^L

Ronald C. Barker
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, of the Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter, and
of exhibits thereto to be mailed, postage prepaid, and/or to be
hand delivered the 6th day of February, 1995 to Ann L. Wasserman,
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and/or to be transmitted via FAX #(801) 575-7834.

Ronald C. Barker
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David Paul White, #3441
Attorney for Defendant
7434 South State St. #102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone (801) 566-8188

ilsuPii'SS
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Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Co-Counsel for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
Attorneys for defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
DALE P. HOLT,

ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT,
FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC.

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 934700554 DA
VICKI L. HOLT,
Judge W. Brent West
Defendant.
—ooOoo—
This matter came on for hearing on February 14, 1995.

The

hearing was conducted by conference call, the Honorable W. Brent
West presiding.

Participants in the call were the Court, Ann L.

Wassermann, counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald L. Barker and David Paul
White, counsel for Defendant. The Court having reviewed the Motion
of the Defendant to correct judgment, for a new trial, etc., having
reviewed

the

Memorandum,

Memorandum,

and

the

two

errata

to

and the Court having considered the comments
1

the
of

counsel,

and being

fully advised,

now makes

and enters

the

following Findings and Order:
1.

The Court finds that some of the matters raised by the

Defendant were previously considered and heard by the Court on
November 4, 1994 and that the additional matters presented by
defendant's motion have not persuaded the Court to change its prior
ruling.

Accordingly, the Order on post-trial motions previously

entered by the Court should stand as, entered except as modified in
5 3 below.
2.

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to produce

any new evidence with regard to assets of the parties.
3.

Each of the parties is awarded ownership of h of the

cemetery lots.
4.

Defendant's motion for a new trial is hereby denied.

DATED this 1\*~ day of .Esbnrary, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

r^

HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing revised proposed ORDER IN RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC., this
24th day of February, 1995, to:
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East

Salt Lake City, Utah

84102
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Tab 10

E. PAUL WOOD - 3537
ANN L. WASSERMAN - A3395
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt,
Appellee and Cross Appellant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE P. HOLT,

v.

: MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION
: OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF
:
:
:

VICKIE L. HOLT,

:

Plaintiff, Appellee
and Cross Appellant,

Defendant, Appellant
and Cross Appellee

: Case No. 950169-CA
: Judge
ooOoo

Appellee

and Cross Appellant, Dale P. Holt, by

and

through his undersigned attorneys of record, moves this court
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to
strike portions of Appellant Vickie Holt's Brief.

A list of the

specific texts of the Brief which Mr. Holt moves to be stricken is
attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.

A

significant portion of Mrs. Holt's Brief contains references to
evidence submitted post-trial and not considered by the Court when
making its ruling. All references to the post-trial evidence, the
post-trial evidence itself and arguments based upon the post-trial
evidence should be stricken.

The factual background for this Motion is:
1.

On April 16, 1993, Dale P. Holt ("Mr. Holt") filed

a Complaint for Divorce against his wife, Vickie L. Holt ("Mrs.
Holt") .
2.

On May 13, 1993, Mrs. Holt filed a Verified Answer

and Counterclaim for Divorce.
3.

Trial on the Complaint and Counterclaim was held

before the Honorable W. Brent West, Second District Court Judge
presiding June 13 to June 15, 1994.
4.

On June 15, 1994, the Court ruled on custody and

visitation issues and reserved all economic issues for further
ruling.
5.

On August 3, 1994, the Court entered its ruling

awarding alimony, dividing the marital estate and awarding tax
exemption and fees and requesting the parties to present proposed
buy-out plans.
6.

On November 4, 1994, Mr. Holt filed a Motion to

Clarify Supplement and/or Reconsider Findings and submitted a Plan
for redeeming Mrs. Holt's stock.
7.

On November 4, 1994, Mrs. Holt filed a Motion to

Correct Ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or for a New
Trial.

2

8.

Both Motions were heard November 5, 1994.

9.

On January 4, 1995, the Court entered its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment, on the June
13-15,

1994 Trial and November 5, 1994 Hearing on Post-Trial

Motions.
10.

On January 20, 1995, the Court entered an additional

Order on Post-Trial Motions.
11.
(over

100

On February 2, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed a voluminous

pages)

Rule

59

Motion

to

Alter

Amend

Findings,

Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post-Trial Motions, to
Distribute Additional Assets or for a New Trial, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit

"B" and incorporated herein by reference.

Attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities are Affidavits
of Paul Shields and Robert H. Hunter, Certified Public Accountants
which contain evidence, summaries, charts and other matters not
considered by the Court either in its June 13-15, 1994 Trial or in
the November 5, 1994 Hearing.
12.

Additionally, several corrections to the supporting

Memorandum and Affidavits were subsequently added by Mrs. Holt.
13.

On March 7, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed Notice of Appeal.

14.

On March 21, 1995, the trial court entered its Order

3

on Post-Trial Motions, denying all relief requested by Mrs, Holt,
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein
by reference•
15.

On January 17, 1996, Mrs. Holt filed her Appellant's

Brief with this Court.
16.

On February 7, 1996, Mrs. Holt filed her Corrected

Appellant's Brief with this Court.
17.

Mrs. Holt's Corrected Appellant's Brief contains

numerous citations to the Affidavit of Paul Shields and Robert
Hunter attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of the Rule 59 Motion and several arguments based thereon.
The trial court did not have before it any of this evidence during
the June 13-15, 1994 Trial or during the November 5, 1994 Hearing
on the Post-Trial Motion.
DATED this

fat^

day of May, 1996.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

By:/E. Paul Wood, Esq.
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt
Appellee and Cross Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy
of the foregoing, Motion to Strike Portion of Appellant's Brief,
this

^ ^ d a y of May, 1996, to:

RONALD C. BARKER
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
DAVID PAUL WHITE
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200
Murray, Utah 8412 3

a*/fdm
w5\holt.mot
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EXHIBIT M A H
Appellant Vickie L. Holt's Corrected Brief of Appellant
filed February 7, 1996 contains references to the Affidavits of
Paul Shield and Robert Hunter, and attachments to their respective
Affidavits

and

contention

based

on

Paul

Shield's

and

Robert

Hunter's Affidavits in the text of the Brief;
All references to the "Record ("R") after record page 400
are outside the scope of evidence heard at trial or in the November
5, 1994 Hearing,
Page of Appellant's Brief

Reference to Post-Trial Evidence

Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D

Paul Shield's Affidavit
26 U.S.C.S. §01041
1994 Commerce Clearing House
Income Taxes
26 U.S.C.S. §301
§301 Distribution of Property
Technical Advice Memorandum
July 20, 1990
Article, Journal of Corporate
Taxation
Affidavit of Robert H. Hunter
Attachment to Paul Shield's
Affidavit
Argument, Footnote 6
Footnote 8
Footnote 9
Footnote 10
Footnote 16

Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Appendix H
Appendix I
Appendix 0
P. 1, para. 1/
para. 1(b)
para. 1(c)
P. 2, para. 1(d)
P. 4, para. 2(a)
P. 5, top o:E page
para. 5
P. 6,
P. 9-10, subpara. (f)
P. 13, subp<ara. (b)(1)
P. 15, subpcara. (e)
P. 16,

Footnote
Appendix
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote

20
B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I.
39
62
75, 76 and 77
78

P.
P.
P.
P.
P.
P.
P.
P.

21, subpara. (d)
24, portion of subpara. (f)
25, para. 13,
33-34, subpara. (i)
42, subpara. (b)
43, entire page
44, top of page
45, para. 21

Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote

7

86
99 and 102
105
138, 139, 140,
175 and 176
178 and 179
181

EXHIBIT "B"

r

rEa

o

l i;2

David Paul White, #3441
Attorney for Defendant
7434 South State St.' #102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone (801) 566-8188
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Co-Counsel for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE P. HOLT,

) DEFENDANT'S URCP 59 MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS,
) CONCLUSIONS, ORDER AND
JUDGMENT, ORDER ON POST
) TRIAL MOTIONS, TO DISTRIBUTE

Plaintiff,
vs.

ADDITIONAL

)
VICKIE

ASSETS

OR FOR A NEW

TRIAL

L. K3LT,
934700554 DA
Defendant
3rent

VJest

ocOoo

Defendant's additional Motions
Defendant also moves the Court fcr oroers as follows.
A
Motion For a New Tr^aj,
1.

New trial - For a new trial rased uc-on each of the

following grounds:

1

(a)
Accident

Accident
or

or

surprise

surprise,

which

-

Pursuant

ordinary

to

prudence

URCP

59(a) (3) .

could

not

have

guarded against*
(b) N e w l y

discovered

evidence

-

Pursuant

to

URCP

59(a) (4)

Newly discovered material evidence which defendant could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(c)

Inadequate

damages

-

Pursuant

to

URCP

59(a) (5) .

Inadequate d a m a g e s .
(d)

Insufficiency

Insufficiency

of

evidence

of evidence

-

Pursuant

to

URCP

59(a) (6)

to justify the decision and/or

because

the decision is against law, and/or
(e)

Error in law - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (7) .

Error in law.

i
Motion
2.
moved

To alter or

amend

the Court pursuant

amending

said

Findings,

to Alter or Amend
judgment

to URCP

and orders

59(e)

Conclusions,

- Defendant: also

for an order

Order

and/or

altering
Judgment

Order on Post Trial Motions and other applicable judgments
orders.

2

or
and

and/or

c
3.

Incorporation of prior motions by reference - Defendant

also hereby incorporates herein and re-alleges the contents of her
Motions and Memorandum entitled

xx

Defendants Memorandum re Motion to

Correct ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or For a New
Trial'' dated 11/3/94," which was entered herein on January 10,
1995, together with the exhibits and affidavits thereto,1 a copy of
which

is attached

hereto

as Ex. #1.-

Although

said motions

addressed the Court's Ruling, and were prepared prior to entry of
the Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on
Post Trial Motions, etc., since there was little change from the
Court's Ruling, the matters argued therein also apply to the
Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order en FesTrial Motions, etc. mentioned above. Reference thereon :o the
Court's Ruling is hereby amended to refer to the Court's
Conclusions, Order and
4.

Findings,

Judgment, Order on Post Trial Motions, etc.

Order on Post Trial Motions purports to deny defendant's

11/3/94 motions which were reserved by the Court - At the 11/4/94
hearing, the Court declined to consider oral argument raised

zj

defendant's 11/3/94 motion, and invited defendant to bring those
matters before the Court after entry of the Findings, Conclusions
1

A copy of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum is attached

hereto as Ex. #1.
3

and Order.

To the extent that the uOrder on Post Trial Motions

purports to deny defendant's motions contained therein, defendant
moves the Court for an order vacating said order and permitting
oral

argument

of the matters asserted

in defendant's

11/3/94

motion, Exhibit #1 hereto.
D
Supporting Affidavits, Exhibits, Memorandum, etc.
5.

Supporting documents - The above-mentioned motions are

supported by this Memorandum of Authorities and by the affidavits
of defendant (below), of Paul Shields,2 of Robert Hunter* and
exhibits thereto, together with testimony and exhibits received
evidence at the trial of this matter.
E
Matters to which Defendant's Motions pertain
6.
Trial

Findings, Conclusions, Judgment & Orders, Order on Post

Motions,

etc.

to

which

defendant's

motions

Defendant's motions pertain to the Court's

pertain

Findings

Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment entered

of Fact,

in the abcve-

entitled matter about 1/10/95; also to the Court's Order en ?:s:
Trial Motions entered herein about 1/25/95;

and generally to all

A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #2.
A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #3.
4

or tie Courts orders and decisions with respect to cistrioution or
assets, payment of income raxes which may be incurred as a result
of the Court's decision, the award of alimony and child support,
payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees and costs, life
insurance, mandatory income withholding,

and to other orders which

pertain to financial matters.
Dated February 6, 1995.

DAVID PAUL WHITE and RONALD C. BARKER
Attorneys for defendant

BV: (P^n^Uj

£

SU^L,

Ronald C. Barker
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, of the Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter, and
of exhibits thereto to be mailed, postage prepaid, and/or to be
hand delivered the 6th day of February, 1995 to Ann L. Wasserman,
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and/or to be transmitted via FAX #(801) 575-7834.

Donald C. Barker

EXHIBIT "C

David Paul White, #3441 \
Attorney for Defendant
7434 South State St. #102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone (801) 566-8188

[!;? :i
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Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Co-Counsel for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
Attorneys for defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
DALE P. HOLT,
ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT,
FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC.

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 934700554 DA
VICKI L. HOLT,
Judge W. Brent West
Defendant.
--00O00--

This matter came on for hearing on February 14, 1995.

The

hearing was conducted by conference call, the Honorable W. Brent
West presiding.

Participants in the call were the Court, Ann L.

Wassermann, counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald L. Barker and David Paul
White, counsel for Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the Motion

of the Defendant to correct judgment, for a new trial, etc., having
reviewed
Memorandum,

the

Memorandum,

and

the

two

errata

to

and the Court having considered the comments
1

the
of

counsel,

and being

fully 'advised,

now makes

and enters

the

following Findings and Order:
1.

The Court finds that some of the matters raised by the

Defendant were previously considered and heard by the Court on
November 4, 1994 and that the additional matters presented by
defendant's motion have not persuaded the Court to change its prior
ruling.

Accordingly, the Order on post-trial motions previously

entered by the Court should stand as, entered except as modified in
5 3 below.
2.

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to produce

any new evidence with regard to assets of the parties.
3.

Each of the parties is awarded ownership of \

of the

cemetery lots.
4.

Defendant's motion for a new trial is hereby denied.

DATED this

2\~~ day of S&btAxrr?,

1995.

BY THE COURT:

AS

HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing revised proposed ORDER IN RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC., this
24th day of February, 1995, to:
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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E. PAUL WOOD - 3537
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt,
Appellee and Cross Appellant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE P. HOLT,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLEE'S MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff, Appellee
and Cross Appellant,
VICKIE L. HOLT,
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross Appellee

Case No. 950169-CA
Judge
ooOoo

Appellee/Cross Appellant, .Dale P. Holt, by and through
his undersigned attorneys of record, submits this Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to Strike portion's
of Appellant Mrs. Holt's Brief.
Mrs.

Holt

has

included

This Memorandum shall show that

evidence

in her Brief

which

was

not

considered by the trial court in its rulings, which under Utah law
should not be considered on appeal.

MRS. HOLT'S APPEAL BRIEF CONTAINING EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN
CONNECTION WITH A RULE 59 MOTION AFTER TRIAL SHOULD BE STRICKEN
Significant

portions

of

both

text,

footnotes

and

appendices of Mrs. Holt's Brief on Appeal contain evidence which
was not before the trial court at the time of its ruling.

The

evidence was submitted in connection with Mrs. Holt's Rule 59
Motion one month after the court entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment.

Trial in the matter was

held June 13-15, 1994 and Post-Trial Motions to clarify the records
were submitted November 4, 1994 with a Hearing on the Motions held
November 5, 1994. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and
Judgment on the trial and hearing were entered by the court January
4, 1995.

A subsequent Order on Post-Trial Motions was entered by

the Court January 20, 1995.

Mrs. Holt filed a Rule 59 Motion to

Alter or Amend Pleadings and for a New Trial February 2, 1995. The
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted in support thereof
contains Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert H. Hunter with
numerous exhibits. On March 21, 1995, the trial court denied Mrs.
Holt's Motion.
Order.

Mrs. Holt appealed the trial court's Judgment and

Mrs. Holt Appeal Brief contained numerous citations and

references to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and attached
exhibits submitted with the Rule 59 Motion February 2, 1995, which
were not before the court at trial.
2

Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have on
several occasions held that evidence submitted in a Brief on Appeal
which was not before the trier of fact must be excluded from
consideration in the appeal process. In Mauqhn v. Maughn, 770 P. 2d
156

(Utah App. 1989), the Plaintiff/Appellant husband included

projected income losses in his Reply Brief which had not been
previously admitted into evidence at trial.

The Court of Appeal

granted the Appellee's Motion to Strike the entire Brief.

In

Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah
App. 1989), the parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
and the trial court granted the Mortgagor's Motion.
appealed.

The Mortgagee

At the trial court level, prior to consideration of the

Motion for Summary Judgment, the Mortgagee failed to submit the
deposition of a witness named John Baird and moved to supplement
the record on appeal prior to oral argument.

The Utah Court of

Appeals held:
Thus, the trial court did not have John
Baird's deposition before it when it granted
the Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Evidence not available to the trial judge
cannot be added to the record on Appeal,
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc.,
739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah App. 1987), and
thus we deny [the mortgagee's] Motion to
Supplement.
Accordingly, we consider only
facts properly before the trial court,
notwithstanding that both parties to this
action repeatedly cite to Baird's Deposition
in their Appellant Briefs.
Territorial
Savings & Loan Association v. Baird at 455-56.
3

Also see Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 123
(Utah 1986); Govert Copier Painting v. Van
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 170 (Utah App. 1990);
Jackson v. Remington Park, Inc., 874 P.2d 814,
815 (Okla App. 1994) .
CONCLUSION
Since the trial court did not have before it the argument
or evidence contained in Mrs. Holt's Rule 59 Motion when making
decisions on the merits of the case, this Court should strike those
portions of Mrs. Holt's Appeal Brief making reference to the
argument or evidence contained in the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities and attachments submitted with the Rule 59 Motion.

DATED this

7-lt ^ d a y of May, 1996.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

MM

(\

By:TE. Paul Wood, Esq.
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt
Appellee and Cross Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy
of the foregoing, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion to Strike,

this $^•&

day of May, 1996, to:

RONALD C. BARKER
287 0 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
DAVID PAUL WHITE
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200
Murray, Utah 84123

\ -2/t^c, DL^L/CVESt^t/c^-'

w5\holt.mem
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